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INTRODUCTION
Criticism of the laws governing corporate reorganization is not a
new phenomenon. Over forty years ago, a leading commentator noted
that
[t]here are three striking things about the reorganization sec-
tions of the federal income tax law. The first is their almost
unbelievable intricacy. The second is that due to this very
intricacy, they have been . . . one of the most serious tax
avoidance leaks . . . . But the most striking thing of all is
that no one can satisfactorily explain why they were ever
enacted or why, having been enacted, they have remained.'
1 Sandberg, The Income Tax Subsidy to "Reorganizations," 38 COLUM. L. REv.
98, 98 (1938); see also H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 12-14 (1934), re-
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This view was offered in 1938, and many would say that matters have
deteriorated since then.'
Provisions similar to those under criticism have remained in place
down to the present day. Over time, modern approaches have become
entwined with older principles, creating a Penelope's web of legislative,
judicial, and administrative rules, principles, and doctrines. Indeed, one
commentator recently opined that the complexity of the corporate tax
law is so great that it approaches that of living organisms,' and that the
perspective of a cultural anthropologist might successfully be employed
for its study.
4
This Article takes a leaf from that book in exploring the evolution
of the law of taxation of corporate acquisitions. After reviewing the
historical development of reorganizations, the Article discusses the re-
cent Supreme Court case of Paulsen v. Commissioner,5 which may give
birth to a whole new species. It then examines the current problems of
the organism and, with the perspective gained from that analysis, criti-
cizes the Senate Finance Committee staff proposals for reform, which
are derived from proposals of the American Law Institute and other
professional associations. The Article concludes that, as with any com-
plex biological organism, it is dangerous to introduce major mutations.'
The present system, flawed as it is, is preferable to the proposals for
reform.
I. CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS AS DISPOSITIONS OF PROPERTY
This Article focuses on five major types of acquisitive corporate
printed in 1939-1 C.B. 554, 563-65 (House Ways and Means Committee report pro-
posing restrictions on the reorganization provisions of the tax code in order to prevent
tax avoidance); S. REP. No. 558, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 16-17 (1934), reprinted in 1939-
1 C.B. 586, 598-99 (Senate Finance Committee expressing agreement with proposals
aimed at eliminating tax-avoidance schemes).
2 See, e.g., Ginsburg, Tax Simplification-A Practitioner's View, 26 NAT'L TAX
J. 317, 327-28 (1973); Roberts, A Report on Complexity and the Income Tax, 27 TAX
L. REv. 325, 334 (1972).
3 See Clark, The Morphogenesis of Subchapter C: An Essay in Statutory Evolu-
tion and Reform, 87 YALE L.J. 90, 93 (1977).
4 See id. at 90-91.
s 105 S. Ct. 627 (1985).
6 The pioneering work of Dr. Hermann J. Muller showed that random X rays
produced unfavorable mutations in the Drosophila melanogaster species of the fruit fly,
including vermilion eyes, tan body, tiny bristles, truncated wings, splotched appearance,
and cloven thorax. See Muller, The Problem of Genic Modification, 1928 ZEITSCHRIFr
FOR INDUKTIVE ABSTAMMUNGS-UND VERERBUNGSLEHRE 234 (Supp. 1) (Proceedings
of the Fifth International Congress of Genetics, Berlin 1927), reprinted in H.
MULLER, STUDIES IN GFETics 252, 259-60 (1962). For this work Dr. Muller re-
ceived the Nobel prize for medicine in 1946. See E. CARLSON, GENES, RADIATION,
AND SocIETY: THE LIFE AND WORK OF H. J. MULLER 308-13 (1981).
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reorganizations: Type A, a statutory merger or consolidation; Type B,
a stock-for-stock acquisition; Type C, an asset acquisition (sometimes
called a practical merger); triangular Type A, a transaction involving a
transfer of assets by the acquired corporation to the acquiring corpora-
tion's controlled subsidiary in exchange for stock of the parent; and
reverse triangular Type A, a transaction in which the acquiring corpo-
ration merges into the acquired corporation and the parent of the ac-
quiring corporation then assumes control of the acquired corporation.7
Acquisitive reorganizations are part of the larger subject of corporate
reorganizations; indeed, they form the lion's share of the law in this
area. Since acquisitive transactions have been linked by statute, if not
by economic reality, to the other forms of reorganization, much of what
is said in this Article will apply to all forms of corporate
reorganization.8
The reorganizations discussed in this Article should be seen as a
part of the broad category of transactions of sales and other dispositions
of property. Indeed, the reorganization provisions were originally en-
acted as part of the same statutory scheme that provided for nonrecog-
nition of like-kind exchanges and involuntary conversions.9 It is, there-
fore, useful to review briefly the basic rules for taxing dispositions of
property, particularly as they relate to corporate reorganizations.
The first fundamental question in the taxation of corporate reor-
ganization transactions is whether there has been a realizing event. In
the American tax system, appreciation in the value of property is usu-
ally taxed only when the gain is realized, that is, when the property is
sold or otherwise disposed of.10
7 Other types of reorganization, covered only incidentally in this Article, include
Type D, which involves either a shift of control or a corporate division; Type E, a
recapitalization or reshuffling of the capital structure of a single corporation; Type F, a
mere change in identity, form, or place of organization of one corporation; and Type G,
an acquisition of the assets of a corporation involved in a bankruptcy proceeding. See
I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(D)-(G) (1982 & West Supp. 1985). Also not covered in this Arti-
cle, except incidentally, are I.R.C. § 351 (1982), governing the transfer of property to
a controlled corporation, and I.R.C. §§ 331-346 (1982 & West Supp. 1985), governing
corporate liquidations, although some of the goals sought to be accomplished through
reorganizations can be achieved through these other transactions.
8 See infra text accompanying notes 279-300.
See Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 203, 43 Stat. 253, 256.
'0 See Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 202-03 (1920) (involving the taxability
of a pro rata stock dividend, the treatment of which is currently governed by I.R.C.
§ 305 (1982)); see also Marr v. United States, 268 U.S. 536 (1924) (holding that
General Motors' change of state of incorporation from New Jersey to Delaware was a
realization event). There are, however, exceptions to the requirement of realization.
Among these are the undistributed profits of a controlled foreign corporation, a pro rata
share of which is consiaered taxable income to United States shareholders, see I.R.C.
§ 951(a)(1) (1982), and commodity and stock option tax straddles, see I.R.C. § 1256
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This requirement of a realization is at the core of the field of cor-
porate reorganizations." It is only because of the requirement of a real-
ization that a significant amount of untaxed gain may accrue on stock
or business assets. 2 When a sale or other transaction involving a corpo-
ration occurs, this hitherto accrued and untaxed gain may be taxed un-
less the tax adviser plans for compliance with the complex rules gov-
erning nonrecognition of income."
Once it is ascertained that there has been a realizing event (and
usually that question is clear), the next issue is the size of the gain or
loss realized. 4 A shareholder disposing of stock, or a corporation dis-
posing of assets in connection with a reorganization, must compute re-
alized gain or loss. This computation is performed just as it would be
for any taxpayer disposing of property: the gain or loss realized equals
the amount realized minus the adjusted basis.15 The amount realized is
the amount of money received plus the fair market value of any other
property received. 6 The adjusted basis is usually the cost of the prop-
erty. If the property was acquired not by purchase but rather by gift,
inheritance, or some other nonrecognition transaction, however, the ba-
sis of the property will be determined by the basis rule appropriate to
that transaction. Moreover, the basis may be adjusted for such items as
depreciation, capital expenditures, or casualty losses.1 '
After the amount of gain or loss "realized" has been computed,
attention then focuses on the amount of gain or loss that will be "recog-
nized." Income realized in an acquisitive corporate transaction will re-
ceive nonrecognition treatment-with an appropriate adjustment to ba-
sis-when the transaction is characterized as a "reorganization" and
the parties follow certain further rules set forth in the Code.1
The final task is characterizing the gain or loss as capital gain or
ordinary income.19 In addition to the usual rules for characterizing rec-
(1982 & West Supp. 1985). Cf. Helvering v. Bruun, 309 U.S. 461 (1940) (finding
improvements to leased property to be income to the lessor upon forfeiture of the lease;
this situation is now covered by I.R.C. §§ 109, 1019 (1982)).
" See infra text accompanying notes 279-300.
2 See infra text accompanying notes 304-18.
's See infra notes 304-24 and accompanying text.
1 See I.R.C. § 1001(a) (1982).
15 See id.
18 See I.R.C. § 1001(b) (1982).
11 See I.R.C. §§ 1001(a), (b), 1011 (1982); see also D. PosIN, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS 151-69 (1983). These further adjustments generally in-
volve tangible property held by corporations or individuals. Such adjustments would not
generally be made to the basis of stock, other than with respect to commissions or other
acquisition costs.
" See infra notes 308-18 and accompanying text.
" See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 1221-1222 (1982 & West Supp. 1985) (requiring capital
19851
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ognized gains and losses, the reorganization area provides some special-
ized rules of its own.
20
These are the general principles that have governed the treatment
of dispositions of property. While the principles themselves are reason-
ably straightforward, their application to the complex world of corpo-
rate acquisitions has proven to be an enormously difficult task. For over
half a century, Congress, the courts, and the Treasury Department
have struggled to formulate a consistent and sensible approach to these
kinds of transactions.
II. HISTORY OF CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS
A. Early Stirrings
More than in most other areas of the tax law, the principles of
corporate reorganizations are rooted in history. Some of the older prin-
ciples still retain influence, and studying their historical evolution is a
useful means of understanding their apparently illogical application to
present-day transactions.
The predecessor of the modern corporate income tax was enacted
in 1909, and the first modern income tax on individuals was enacted in
1913, after the passage of the sixteenth amendment to the Constitu-
tion.21 Yet, in the several years after the sixteenth amendment and the
first corporate income tax were enacted, not a word about "corporate
reorganization" was spoken, and the walls of the Republic did not
come tumbling down.
In fact, the first stirrings in this hitherto nonexistent subject came
not from Congress but from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
who promulgated a series of rulings to the effect that exchanges of
property or stock did not give rise to taxable income.12 Having stirred
up the matter, the Commissioner in 1918 proceeded to retreat. He
ruled that stock-for-stock exchanges in which the stock received had a
greater par value than the stock given up and exchanges of property for
stock both might result in taxable income.23 The precursor of present-
gains treatment when the transaction involves the sale or exchange of a capital asset).
10 See infra notes 308-18 and accompanying text.
2 The first modern corporate tax was embodied in the Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act
of 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 112, repealed by Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, § 4(S),
38 Stat. 114, 201. The sixteenth amendment, which legitimated the federal income tax
on individuals, was necessitated by the Supreme Court's decision in Pollock v. Farmers'
Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895) (holding that the Income Tax Act of 1894, ch.
346, §§ 35-36, 28 Stat. 509, 559, was unconstitutional).
• See R. PAUL, STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION 8 (3d ser. 1940).
2 See id. (citing Treas. Reg. 33, arts. 101, 118-119 (1918)).
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day section 351, allowing for a tax-free transfer of property to a con-
trolled corporation, surfaced in 1919 with the Commissioner's ruling
that a transfer of property to a corporation was not closed if the trans-
feror owned more than fifty percent of the stock of the corporation.24
Higher rates are the mother of tax invention, and it was the tax
act of 1917,25 with unprecedentedly steep marginal rates designed to
help finance World War I, that stimulated an interest in reorganization
provisions. In 1919, Congress enacted the first statutory exclusion for
income resulting from corporate reorganizations.2" This provision es-
tablished a condition that has continued down to the present, namely,
that for the exclusion to apply to an exchange of stock or securities, the
exchange must be made in connection with a "reorganization, merger,
or consolidation of a corporation. '27 Gain on the exchange would be
taxed only to the extent that the par or face value of the stock or securi-
ties received exceeded the par or face value of the stock or securities
surrendered.2 This approach for taxing some of the gain is similar to
the approach used in the current statute, except that the par value of
stock in the current statute is quite rightly irrelevant to the question of
taxability of the transaction.29 The entire scheme was put in the form
of an exception to the general rule that exchanges of property are taxa-
ble events.3 0 A slight oversight of the Act was that it failed to define the
essential terms "reorganization, merger, or consolidation." This little
gap was filled by subsequent regulations and statutory enactments, and
24 See id. (citing Treas. Reg. 45, art. 1566). This ruling was later withdrawn, see
T.D. 2924, 1 C.B. 44 (1919), and matters in this area remained unclear until the
enactment of the Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, 42 Stat. 227 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). See id. § 202(c), 42 Stat. at 230 (codified as amended
at I.R.C. § 351(a) (1982)) (stating that no gain or loss shall be recognized when a
person transfers property to a corporation and immediately thereafter is in control of
that corporation).
25 Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, § 2, 40 Stat. 300, 301, repealed by Revenue Act
of 1918, ch. 18, § 1400, 40 Stat. 1057, 1149 (1919).
26 See Act of Feb. 24, 1919, ch. 18, § 202(b), 40 Stat. 1057, 1060 (1919), re-
pealed by Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 1400, 42 Stat. 227, 320.
27 Id.
28 Id.
20 See I.R.C. § 354(a)(2)(A)(i) (1982).
20 See Act of Feb. 24, 1919, ch. 18, § 202(b), 40 Stat. 1057, 1060:
When property is exchanged for other property, the property received in
exchange shall for the purpose of determining gain or loss be treated as
the equivalent of cash to the amount of its fair market value, if any; but
when in connection with reorganization, merger, or consolidation of a cor-
poration a person receives in place of stock or securities owned by him
new stock or securities of no greater aggregate par or face value, no gain
or loss shall be deemed to occur from the exchange, and the new stock or
securities received shall be treated as taking the place of the stock, securi-
ties, or property exchanged.
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it is filled to overflowing in the current statute and attendant
regulations."1
At approximately the same time that these initial administrative
and legislative steps were being taken, the first reorganization cases
were beginning to take shape in the lower courts. These cases inter-
preted the statute as it read from 1913 through 1916, when it contained
no references to reorganizations at all. The Supreme Court's pro-
nouncements in these cases," issued during the 1920's, indicate the
road not taken, illustrating what might have happened in the reorgani-
zation area had there been no statutory development. They also signifi-
cantly influenced later statutory provisions.
The early reorganization cases can be understood only against the
backdrop of the seminal case of Eisner v. Macomber."3 Macomber did
not involve a reorganization, but it set a standard for determining taxa-
bility of corporate transactions with which the subsequent reorganiza-
tion cases had to contend. In Macomber the Court held that it was
unconstitutional to tax a shareholder on receipt of a pro rata stock divi-
dend.34 The Court's theory in this case was that the stock dividend was
not a gain severed from the capital of the corporation but simply a
representation of the shareholder's continued investment. 5 The corpo-
ration involved in the case had in fact been profitable, and the stock
dividend was backed by an appropriate accounting transfer from earned
surplus to capital account." Nonetheless, the Court found that to tax
the pro rata stock dividend would be in effect to tax the appreciation in
value of the shareholder's investment, rather than to tax the income
from the investment. Taxing the appreciation in value was, in the
Court's view, unconstitutional, whereas there was no question that a
cash dividend would have been taxable.37
It is useful to focus in detail on the meaning of this case. On the
day after the pro rata stock dividend, the shareholder dearly was no
wealthier than the day before. The existence of the new shares in the
hands of the shareholders of the corporation inevitably reduced the
value of the original shares. Thus, the value of the new shares plus the
81 See I.R.C. § 368(a)(1) (1982); Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1, T.D. 7745, 1981-1 C.B.
134; Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2, T.D. 7422, 1976-2 C.B. 108.
32 See Marr v. United States, 268 U.S. 536 (1925); Cullinan v. Walker, 262 U.S.
134 (1923); Rockefeller v. United States, 257 U.S. 176 (1921); United States v. Phellis,
257 U.S. 156 (1921). These cases are discussed infra text accompanying notes 40-79.
83 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
4 See id. at 211.
35 See id. at 209-11.
86 Id. at 200.
837 See id. at 209. Taxability of stock dividends is now governed by I.R.C. § 305
(1982), which in important respects follows the basic Macomber rule.
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original shares in the hands of the shareholder was equal to the value
of her shares the day before the stock dividend: she still had the same
percentage interest in the same corporation. This, however, was not the
basis of the Court's decision. Nor could it have been. For it is also
evident that if the corporation had paid a pro rata cash dividend, the
stockholders would have been no wealthier on the day after the divi-
dend than the day before. The value of the stockholder's shares just
after she received the cash dividend would be reduced pro tanto because
of the distribution of cash from the corporation. Thus, in both
cases-the stock dividend and the cash dividend-the shareholder's
wealth does not increase because of the transaction. But in the Ma-
comber view of the world only the shareholder in receipt of a cash divi-
dend will pay tax: because of the severance of the income from the
capital of the corporation, there has been a realizing event.
Macomber, a major case, was decided by a five-to-four vote, with
Justices Holmes and Brandeis filing separate opinions. Justice Bran-
deis filed a long and vigorous dissent in which he argued that the stock
dividend was in substance the same as if the corporation had offered
stock for purchase on a pro rata basis to its shareholders and simulta-
neously declared a cash dividend equal to the amount that the share-
holder would have to pay the company for the stock."8 In this latter
instance, Brandeis argued, there was no question that the distribution
of the cash dividend would have been taxable. Therefore, the pro rata
stock dividend should itself be taxed." While Brandeis's approach did
not carry the day, it presaged his approach in the subsequent reorgani-
zation cases that severely limited Macomber.
The first of these cases was United States v. Phellis,40 decided in
1921. Phellis involved the migration of the E.I. DuPont de Nemours &
Company from New Jersey to Delaware.41 To effect the transfer, Du-
Pont's New Jersey subsidiary (DuPont New Jersey) transferred all of
its assets to a new Delaware corporation, DuPont Delaware, in ex-
change for common stock and debentures of DuPont Delaware.42 The
DuPont Delaware stock was then distributed to DuPont New Jersey's
stockholders as a pro rata dividend."3 DuPont New Jersey remained
alive as a holding company for the debentures and for a few other
purposes.
44
11 See Macomber, 252 U.S. at 220, 220-21 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
39 See id. at 225.
40 257 U.S. 156 (1921).
41 See id. at 165.
42 Id. at 166.
43 Id. at 167.
44 Id.
1343
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Phellis, an owner of 250 shares of New Jersey stock, received 500
shares of Delaware stock as a dividend under this arrangement. 4" The
Commissioner asserted that the 500 shares constituted income to Phellis
in the amount of their fair market value."' As the case developed, it
appeared that the taxpayer had the better argument, in light of the
Supreme Court's earlier decision in Macomber that a pro rata stock
dividend does not constitute a realizing event.4' Like the shareholder in
Macomber, the shareholder in Phellis owned the same proportion of
shares in the same company after the stock dividend as he owned
before."
Surprisingly, however, the Supreme Court, speaking through Jus-
tice Pitney, reversed the Court of Claims, which had followed the Ma-
comber approach. In holding for the Commissioner, the Court reasoned
that the stock dividend in Macomber had been stock of the distributing
corporation, whereas in Phellis the dividend distributed by DuPont
New Jersey involved the stock of DuPont Delaware.49 The fact was
that DuPont Delaware was essentially the same corporation as DuPont
New Jersey, except for being incorporated in a different state and hav-
ing a greater amount of authorized capital stock. 50 In the view of the
Court, however, these factors were enough to take this case out of the
Macomber rule of nontaxability. They meant that there had been a
severance of income from capital, thereby triggering the "realizing
event" required in Macomber for tax to be imposed.51
A very similar approach was followed by the Court in Rockefeller
v. United States,5 2 decided the same day as Phellis. Rockefeller in-
volved the Prairie Oil & Gas Company, incorporated in Kansas. Be-
cause of a previous Court decision establishing the jurisdiction of the
Interstate Commerce Commission over pipeline operations, 3 the corpo-
ration decided to separate its oil business from its pipeline business. 4
This was done by transferring the pipeline business to a new corpora-
tion, also incorporated in Kansas, and distributing the stock of that new
45 Id. at 165.
48 See id.
47 See supra text accompanying notes 33-39 (discussing Macomber).
41 Compare Macomber, 252 U.S. at 202-03 ("'A stock dividend really takes noth-
ing from the property of the corporation, and adds nothing to the interests of the share-
holders.' ") (quoting Gibbons v. Mahon, 136 U.S. 549, 559 (1890)) with Phellis, 257
U.S. at 168.
49 See Phellis, 257 U.S. at 167.
50 See id. at 167-68.
51 See infra text accompanying notes 319-24.
52 257 U.S. 176 (1921).
53 See generally The Pipe Line Cases, 234 U.S. 548 (1914).
See Rockefeller, 257 U.S. at 177-78.
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corporation immediately to the stockholders of Prairie."
The Court, somewhat unexpectedly, regarded the Rockefeller case
as indistinguishable from Phellis, notwithstanding that there was no
change in state of incorporation in Rockefeller. The pro rata distribu-
tion of the stock of the new corporation was regarded as a realizing
event that triggered taxation of the stockholders. The Court reached
this conclusion in spite of the fact that, as it conceded, "there was ap-
parently little but a reorganization and financial readjustment of the
affairs of the companies concerned, here a subdivision of companies,
without immediate effect upon the personnel of the stockholders, or
much difference in the aggregate corporate activities or properties.""6
In short, distribution of a stock dividend of any corporation other than
the distributing corporation itself apparently constituted a realizing
event. Thus Eisner v. Macomber was closely limited to its facts.
Cullinan v. Walker57 involved a complex transaction designed to
enable the parties involved to accomplish the fashionable ends of the
day, namely (1) to split an oil production company from an oil pipeline
company, and (2) to change the state of incorporation to Delaware."8
To accomplish these goals, the original Texas company was liquidated,
and the trustees in liquidation organized two new Texas companies. To
one they transferred the oil production assets; to the other, the pipeline
assets. The trustees then organized a Delaware corporation, to which
they transferred the stock of the two Texas companies in exchange for
stock in the Delaware corporation. The trustees then distributed the
stock and securities of the Delaware corporation on a pro rata basis to
the former stockholders of the original Texas company. 9 The Commis-
sioner sought to impose a tax on the difference between the value of the
stock and securities in the Delaware corporation that the taxpayers re-
ceived and the cost of the taxpayers' stock in the original Texas com-
pany, yielding approximately $1.5 million in income.6
Justice Brandeis, writing for the majority in an opinion that was
foreshadowed by his dissent in Macomber,6 1 held that the transaction
was taxable.62 This time Brandeis had Phellis and Rockefeller as am-
55 Rockefeller, 257 U.S. at 182-83. A second corporation involved in the Rockefel-
ler case, the Ohio Oil Company, had the same problem as Prairie and undertook the
same solution. The Court disposed of the two cases identically. See id.
"6 Id. at 183.
57 262 U.S. 134 (1923).
58 See id. at 135-37.
59 Id.
60 See id. at 135.
61 See supra text accompanying notes 38-39.
62 Cullinan, 262 U.S. at 138.
1985]
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munition."3 The taxpayer in Cullinan sought to distinguish Phellis and
Rockefeller by arguing that in this case the transaction in question was
a liquidating distribution rather than a stock dividend.64 However,
Brandeis found that a liquidating distribution as well as a dividend
distribution constituted a realizing event.65 It thus appeared that Ma-
comber had been so limited that any financial reorganization other than
a straight pro rata stock dividend would be taxable.
Matters took another surprising turn, however, in the case of
Weiss v. Steam.6 Steam also involved a financial reorganization in
which the assets of one company were shifted to another company
within the same state with no change in proportional ownership of the
stockholders. As in Cullinan, the transaction was in form a liquida-
tion.6" However, in Steam, unlike the previous cases, the shareholders
received half their consideration in cash.68 There was no question that
the cash portion of the transaction was taxable. The issue in the case
was the taxability of the stock portion of the consideration. 9
Based on the previous cases, an observer could have thought that
the stock portion of the transaction in Steam would be taxable. But the
Court found that the principles of Macomber should be applied to
Stearn.70 Justice McReynolds, speaking for the Court, used language
broad enough to reverse Phellis, Rockefeller, and Cullinan: "We can-
not conclude that mere change for purposes of reorganization in the
technical ownership of an enterprise ...followed by issuance of new
certificates, constitutes gain separated from the original capital inter-
est." 7' 1 Justices Holmes and Brandeis dissented on the grounds that the
case was covered by Cullinan.
72
The final decision of this early period was the celebrated case of
Marr v. United States.73 Marr involved a shift in the state of incorpo-
ration of the General Motors Corporation from New Jersey to Dela-
ware. The shareholders of General Motors New Jersey exchanged
their stock for shares of General Motors Delaware. 4 The New Jersey
shareholders received almost exactly the same interest in the Delaware
8 See, e.g., id. at 137 (discussing Phellis and Rockefeller).
See id. at 137-38.
65 See id.
68 265 U.S. 242 (1924).
67 See id. at 251-52.
See id. at 252.
" See id. at 251-52.
70 See id. at 253.
71 Id. at 254.
71 See id. (Holmes and Brandeis, JJ., dissenting).
73 268 U.S. 536 (1925).
74 Id. at 539.
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corporation.
Justice Brandeis, writing for the majority, held on the basis of the
holdings in Phellis, Rockefeller, and Cullinan that the transaction was
taxable.75 He noted that Steam had not involved a new state of incor-
poration (although that was also true in Rockefeller).76 Brandeis as-
serted that Steam was distinguishable from Marr because, while it was
true that technically a new corporation had been formed in Steam,
"the corporate identity was deemed to have been substantially main-
tained." 77 Justice Brandeis also focused on slight changes in the capital
structure of the new corporation that he interpreted as creating inter-
ests different from those that shareholders possessed in the old entity. 8
Justice McReynolds, the author of the Court's opinion in Steam,
joined in Justice Van Devanter's dissenting view that Steam foreclosed
taxation of the transaction in Marr.
The results of the cases in this early period can only be regarded
as unsettling. Outcomes in Macomber and the other early reorganiza-
tion cases seemed to depend not on predictable extensions of precedent,
but rather on a power struggle between the Brandeis-Pitney wing and
the McReynolds wing of the Court. Of the five reorganization cases
decided by the Court over five years, only one was won by the tax-
payer. And that case, Steam, was the one in which taxation was per-
haps most justified. Given the fifty percent cash distribution in Steam,
the resulting new, half-shrunken corporation was more unlike its pred-
ecessor than any of the newly formed entities in the other reorganiza-
tion cases. Yet it was Steam that was held to be closest to Macomber,
in that it resulted in a new corporation whose identity was substantially
maintained." Given the size of these transactions, and the large num-
ber of taxpayers holding stock in General Motors and the other large
corporations involved, the lack of predictability in these cases was
unacceptable.
Since the Court had apparently dropped the ball, it seemed appro-
priate for Congress to step in and pick it up. Congress did so, but then
proceeded to fumble it. In retrospect it might have been better to let the
Court continue to grapple with the problem.
75 See id. at 540.
716 See id. at 541; see also supra text accompanying notes 52-55.
7 Id. at 541.
78 See id. at 541-42.
7 See id. at 542 (Van Devanter, J., joined by McReynolds, Sutherland, and But-
ler, JJ., dissenting).
80 See Steam, 265 U.S. at 253-54.
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B. Statutory Development
As discussed above, the first stirrings in the statutory treatment of
corporate reorganizations came in 1919." Lengthy regulations were
promulgated under the 1919 Act that established conditions under
which shareholders would not be taxed in connection with a reorgani-
zation. The statute and the regulations were not confined to reorganiza-
tions of just one company, but also allowed the combination of two
different companies to occur tax free. This was a major departure from
the case law discussed above. 2 The statute and regulations provided
that the consideration received by the stockholders must be stock or se-
curities in only one of the companies involved. Crude as the 1919 Act
and its attendant regulations were, they set a number of themes that
have continued down to the present, including the requirement that the
transaction involved must be a reorganization, and the emphasis on the
nature of the consideration to be received. At the same time, the help-
fulness of the statute and regulations was limited by their focus on the
importance of par value as a touchstone for the measurement of
taxability.83
The 1921 Act began the process-still incomplete-of defining
"reorganization." The Act generously provided that
[t]he word "reorganization," as used in this paragraph, in-
cludes a merger or consolidation (including the acquisition
by one corporation of at least a majority of the voting stock
and at least a majority of the total number of shares of all
other classes of stock of another corporation, or of substan-
tially all the properties of another corporation), recapitaliza-
tion, or mere change in identity, form, or place of organiza-
tion of a corporation, (however effected) . ... "
By defining reorganization in this relatively sweeping language, Con-
gress clearly sided with the McReynolds view of what should be non-
taxable.8 5 Thus, even before the Brandeis-Pitney wing of the Supreme
8 See supra text accompanying notes 26-31.
82 See cases discussed supra text accompanying notes 40-79.
8" See Act of Feb. 24, 1919, ch. 18, § 202(b), 40 Stat. 1057, 1060; Treas. Reg. 33,
§§ 101, 118-119 (1918).
s, Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 202(c)(2), 42 Stat. 227, 230.
85 Justice McReynolds argued that transactions such as the one involved in
Steam, see supra text accompanying notes 66-72, should not be taxable realization
events to the extent that "[t]he practical result of the things done was, a transfer of the
old assets and business, without increase or diminution or material change of general
purpose, to the new corporation." Steam, 265 U.S. at 252; see also Marr, 268 U.S. at
542 (Van Devanter, J., joined by McReynolds, Sutherland, and Butler, JJ., dissenting)
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Court began to win the judicial battles in this area, they were losing
the legislative war.
In addition to providing greater specificity in the definition of the
term "reorganization," the 1921 Act introduced two new types of reor-
ganizations: "recapitalization" and mere "change in identity, form, or
place of organization of a corporation, (however effected)."86 These two
types of reorganization did not play much of a role in the early years.
Congress made the first of a number of major missteps by failing,
in the 1921 Act, to provide special basis rules for transactions that
qualified as tax-free reorganizations. Taxpayers remained subject to a
cost basis rule,17 in which the cost of property acquired in an exchange
equals the fair market value of the property given up, regardless of
whether there has been any recognition of gain. Alert taxpayers and
their advisers pounced on this opportunity to obtain a tax-free step-up
in the basis of appreciated stock or other property, simply by involving
such property in a qualifying tax-free reorganization. This higher basis
would be of great use to taxpayers in further calculations of gain or loss
on the property, as well as in calculations of depreciation and cost de-
pletion. This easy tax avoidance scheme resulted in large revenue
losses." Moreover, the 1921 Act excluded gain on exchanges of "like
kind"8 9 property from the definition of income-an exclusion that al-
lowed taxpayers simply to exchange stocks and bonds (as well as other
property) tax free without reference to whether there was a reorganiza-
tion at all.
Having created a statute with major loopholes in 1921, Congress
returned to the fray in 1923 to restrict the tax-free treatment of ex-
changes of stocks and bonds to transactions involving corporate reorga-
nizations. 90 Subsequently, in 1924, Congress returned to the fray with
a vengeance, enacting a comprehensive statute prepared at the Trea-
sury Department.91 The 1924 statute is a remarkable accomplishment
in its comprehensiveness and detail. It set down much of the language
("The practical result of the things done was [that] . . . [t]he business and assets were
not materially changed, and the stockholder received nothing actually severed from his
original capital interest .... ).
SB Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 202(c)(2), 42 Stat. 227, 230.
87 Id. § 202(a), 42 Stat. at 227, 229.
" See H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 7, 13 (1924).
8 Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 202(c)(1), 42 Stat. 227, 230. The current
version of this provision does not apply to exchanges of stocks, bonds, and other securi-
ties. See I.R.C. § 1031(a)(2) (1982 & West Supp. 1985).
*o See Revenue Act of 1923, ch. 294, 42 Stat. 1560.
91 See Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, 43 Stat. 253, discussed in A. BAAR & G.
MORRIS, HIDDEN TAxEs IN CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS 16-18 (1935) (describ-
ing the role of the Treasury Department in the preparation of the statute).
1985] 1349
1350 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
and many of the principles that currently govern the treatment of
reorganizations.
The 1924 statute addressed in detail for the first time the treat-
ment of a corporation that transfers property and receives stock in a
reorganization but does not itself disappear. Such a corporation was
granted tax-free treatment.92 The 1924 statute also provided for treat-
ment of boot, finally eliminating the preoccupation with the par value
of stock.9" In addition, the statute allowed reorganization treatment on
receipt of stock or securities without the surrender of stock,94 dealt with
questions of earnings and profits, 5 provided a separate and detailed
definition of a "reorganization," '96 and promulgated substituted basis
rules that prevented a tax-free basis step-up.
97
The great detail of the 1924 Act marked a triumph in the Trea-
sury Department of the approach advocated by A.W. Gregg, Special
Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury, who believed that a compre-
hensive statutory treatment was warranted. The competing approach,
advocated by Dr. Thomas Adams, was that the statute should express
general principles and leave it to the Treasury Department to develop
specific regulations dealing with individual cases. Not surprisingly, the
Treasury Department came to support Dr. Adams's view. Congress,
however, adopted the Gregg approach.'
No major changes occurred until 1934, when once again agitation
for an overhaul began to develop. The statute was proving inadequate
to cope with the myriad forms of business arrangements that it was
designed to cover, and tax avoidance under the reorganization provi-
sions was resulting in an estimated revenue loss of $18 million dollars
annually. 9 Three major tax avoidance techniques were employed: the
sale of assets structured as a reorganization; the distribution of divi-
dends in the form of stock in a subsidiary corporation; and the transfer
of a favorable basis from one asset to another before its sale.100
As a result of these problems and the seeming inability of Con-
92 See Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 203(b)(3), 43 Stat. 253, 256 ("No gain or
loss shall be recognized if a corporation a party to a reorganization exchanges property,
in pursuance of the plan of reorganization, solely for stock or securities in another
corporation a party to the reorganization.").
93 See id. § 203(e), 43 Stat. at 257.
9 See id. § 203(c), 43 Stat. at 256.
95 See id. § 203(g), 43 Stat. at 257.
98 See id. § 203(h), 43 Stat. at 257.
, See id. § 204(a)(6)-(8), (10), 43 Stat. at 258-59.
91 For a description of the competition involving the approaches proposed by Ad-
ams and Gregg, see R. PAUL, supra note 22, at 24 n.81.
1 See id. at 37 n.113.
100 See Sandberg, supra note 1, at 116.
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gress to enact a truly comprehensive statute that would lay all problems
to rest, a subcommittee of the House Ways and Means Committee rec-
ommended total repeal of the reorganization provisions." 1 In a reprise
of the Gregg-Adams debate of ten years earlier, the Treasury opposed
repeal on the grounds that the statute could be redrafted in more gen-
eral terms, which would then give the Treasury and the courts power
to deal with cases of abuse. Moreover, the Treasury was concerned that
repeal of the reorganization provisions would lead to substantial reve-
nue losses, given the declining stock values of that time.'02
This concern over the loss of revenues seems to have been mis-
placed, inasmuch as a key provision of the 1934 legislation was a limi-
tation on the deductibility of capital losses to $2000 plus capital gains
for the year. 03 Also, if recognition of loss was sought, it was certainly
possible to plan a transaction so as to avoid the reorganization
provisions.1
0
4
Congress, however, rejected the idea of repeal. Keeping the ex-
isting statute in place, it simply amended it further to attempt to close
up the three major tax avoidance loopholes of the time. These at-
tempted statutory curatives were not especially effective. 0 5
The 1934 provisions were incorporated into the 1938 statute and
the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 virtually unchanged.'0 6 Indeed, the
statute did not change substantially in this area until the adoption of
the 1954 Code.'07 The 1954 Code did not alter the basic structure, but
it did effect some significant modifications.
A major change of the 1954 legislation was that the corporate divi-
sion provisions-split-ups, split-offs, and spin-offs-were separated
from the reorganization provisions. Thus it was no longer necessary,
after the 1954 Code, for a corporate division to qualify as a reorganiza-
tion in order to enjoy nonrecognition of gain.'0 8 This meant that a cor-
poration could avoid recognition of gain in a corporate division without
101 See R. PAUL, supra note 22, at 37.
102 See Sandberg, supra note 1, at 121, cited in R. PAUL, supra note 22, at 37.
103 See Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 117(d), 48 Stat. 680, 715 (1934) (codified
as amended at I.R.C. § 165(0 (1982)).
104 Cf. United States v. Galveston-Houston Elec. Co., 84 F.2d 516 (1st Cir. 1936)
(holding that lack of control by transferor defeated government's claim of a reorganiza-
tion and allowing a $3 million loss to wipe out a $2 million gain incident to a bank-
ruptcy proceeding).
101 See Sandberg, supra note 1, at 116-20.
106 Compare Internal Revenue Code of 1939, § 112(b)(2)-(4), (c)(1)-(2), (d)(1)-
(2), (e), (g)(1)-(2), (h)-(i), 53 Stat. 1, 37-40 with Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277,
§ 117(d), 48 Stat. 680, 715 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 165 (1982 & West Supp.
1985)).
10M Internal Revenue Code of 1954, ch. 736, § 361, 68A Stat. 118.
108 See I.R.C. §§ 355, 368 (1982 & West Supp. 1985).
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first transferring assets from the parent corporation to a subsidiary.
Treatment of shareholders in a corporate division was also altered.
The active business requirement for the controlled subsidiary was
added,109 as was the rule that the subsidiary's business could not be
acquired in a recognition transaction within five years of the corporate
division. 1 Finally, Congress added a requirement that the parent cor-
poration must continue to conduct an active trade or business after the
division."'
In addition to being separated from the rules governing corporate
divisions, the rules for reorganizations were significantly changed. The
basic structure remained intact, including the definition of a "reorgani-
zation" and the nonrecognition consequences to shareholders, security
holders, and corporations involved in the reorganization. The six basic
types of reorganization identified in the 1939 Code remained in the
1954 Code, although some important details of definition were
changed. The definition of the basic Type A reorganization, the statu-
tory merger or consolidation, was not changed. But the 1954 Code ex-
plicitly established the validity of a so-called "drop-down"-that is, a
transaction in which some of the assets acquired in a reorganization
could be dropped down to a subsidiary.11 Another significant result of
the 1954 legislation was a major set of new rules for restricting the
carryover of losses from one corporation to another in corporate
combinations.11 3
The basic structure of the 1954 reorganization provisions survives
today.11 4 In 1976, the provisions limiting the transferability of loss car-
ryovers in corporate combinations were overhauled, supposedly tight-
ened, and-in the process-made even more complex. 1 However, the
effective date of the new provisions has been postponed several times,
and they still have not gone into effect. 16 The 1984 Deficit Reduction
109 Internal Revenue Code of 1954, ch. 1, § 355(b), 68A Stat. 114, 114 (current
version at I.R.C. § 355(b) (1982)).
110 Id. § 355(a)(3)(B), 68A Stat. at 114 (current version at I.R.C. § 355(a)(3)(B)
(1982)).
"I Id. § 355(b)(1)(A), 68A Stat. at 114 (current version at I.R.C. § 355(b)(1)(A)
(1982)).
12 See id. § 368(a)(2)(C), 68A Stat. at 121 (current version at I.R.C.
§ 368(a)(2)(C) (1982)).
113 See id. § 382, 68A Stat. at 129-31 (current version at I.R.C. § 382 (1982)).
114 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 354-356, 358, 368 (1982 & West Supp. 1985).
115 See Posin, Changes in the Taxation of Corporations Effected by the Tax Re-
form Act of 1976: Part II-Restrictions on Loss Carryover, 4 J. CORP. TAX'N 299,
306-32 (1978) (discussing amendments to I.R.C. §§ 172(b)(1)(B), (b)(3)(E), 382(a)-
(b)).
"I See Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 62, 98 Stat. 494,
583 (postponing the effective date of the 1976 provisions to January 1, 1986).
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Act put into place a requirement that, in general, the transferor corpo-
ration in a Type C reorganization must liquidate in pursuance of the
plan of reorganization.11
C. The Judicial Doctrines
Paralleling, or perhaps in counterpoint to, the statutory develop-
ment described above, there has been a rich development of judicial law
on the subject of reorganizations. Indeed, in places the judicial gloss is
so heavy that the statute is invisible. It is remarkable and of great theo-
retical interest that in a subject so exhaustively covered by statute the
case law should play such a critical role.
The judicial doctrines developed from the interplay between the
early cases and the early statutory provisions. The early cases, dis-
cussed above, presented simple refinancing reorganizations, for which
the income tax statute at the time was unprepared. The inconsistent
results of the early cases provoked a statutory response, which, with its
ambiguities and lacunae, stimulated the planning of more complex
transactions and the growth of more elaborate judicial doctrines. Some
of these doctrines were in turn adopted by later statutory amendments
or by regulations. Others simply held sway in their own right as inter-
pretations of the statute.
1. Continuity of Interest
a. Historical Development
A major judicial doctrine that grew out of the process described
above is the requirement that a taxpayer seeking tax-free treatment in
a reorganization have a "continuity of interest" with the assets she has
transferred. This doctrine first surfaced in the Second Circuit case of
Cortland Specialty Co. v. Commissioner,11 in which the Cortland Spe-
cialty Company, a closely held company engaged in buying and selling
petroleum products, transferred substantially all of its assets to the
Deyo Oil Company. The consideration received from Deyo was
1M See id. § 63, 98 Stat. at 584 (current version at I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(C),
(a)(2)(G) (1982 & West Supp. 1985)); see also H.R. REP. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. 844-45 (1984) (the conference committee's discussion of the distribution require-
ment in Type C reorganizations). The Deficit Reduction Act also loosened the control
requirements for a nondivisive Type D reorganization in order to assist the Internal
Revenue Service in combating the liquidation-reincorporation bailout technique. See
Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, § 64, 98 Stat. 494, 584 (current version at I.R.C.
§ 368(a)(1)(D) (1982)).
118 60 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1932).
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$53,070 in cash and $159,750 in notes with maturities ranging from
two to fourteen months.119 The Second Circuit found that inherent in
the term "reorganization" is the idea that there must be some con-
tinuity of interest on the part of the transferor or its stockholders to
secure exemption from taxation under the reorganization provisions, as-
serting that "[r]eorganization presupposes continuance of business
under modified corporate forms."1 20 The court went on to hold that,
even if there had been a reorganization, the taxpayer would have had
to receive stock or securities in connection with the reorganization in
order to obtain the exemption. The court found that short-term notes,
which were doubtless readily tradable, did not constitute securities for
this purpose.12
Cortland foreshadowed the Supreme Court case of Pinellas Ice &
Cold Storage Co. v. Commissioner,22 although the Court in Pinellas
eschewed the Second Circuit's phrase "continuity of interest. 1 23 Pinel-
las involved the sale to a corporation of all of the assets of two St.
Petersburg, Florida, ice companies under common control. In consider-
ation, the purchasing corporation paid $400,000 in cash and notes in
the face amount of $1,000,000. The notes were secured, carried an in-
terest rate of six percent, and had various maturity dates, although
none of these dates was later than four months from the date of the
transaction. For the most part, the notes were paid before maturity; the
selling corporations distributed the proceeds of the notes to their
stockholders.
1 24
It was not disputed that Pinellas Ice Company, the taxpayer, had
realized a gain of $500,000. The taxpayer maintained, however, that
the gain should not be taxed, because the transaction was a reorganiza-
tion under the applicable statute. The 1926 revenue statute provided, in
a pattern similar to the present statute, that no gain or loss would be
recognized if a corporation that was a party to a reorganization ex-
changed property solely for stock or securities in another corporation
that was also a party to the reorganization. 25 If some cash was received
in the reorganization, the realized gain would be recognized.12 ' Thus,
the 1926 statute, like the current Code, presented two questions: (1)
Was there a reorganization? (2) Were stock or securities in a corpora-
119 Id. at 938.
120 Id. at 940.
121 See id. at 940.
122 287 U.S. 462 (1933).
121 See id. at 470 (citing Cortland, 60 F.2d at 939-40).
224 See id. at 463-65.
125 See Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 203(b)(3), 44 Stat. 9, 12.
128 See id. § 203(b), 44 Stat. at 12, cited in Pinellas, 287 U.S. at 465-66.
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tion that was a party to the reorganization received as consideration by
the taxpayer?1
2 7
The answer to both questions had to be "yes" to result in nontax-
ability. It should be noted, however, that the first question was more
significant than the second. If the answer to the first question were
"no," then there would be no reorganization at all, and the taxpayer
would be taxed on its entire realized gain. If, on the other hand, the
answer to the first question were "yes," then the taxpayer would be
taxed on its realized gain to the extent that the consideration it received
did not consist of stock or securities.
The Court, speaking through Justice McReynolds, answered both
questions "no," although answering either one "no" would have been
sufficient to cause the transaction to be fully taxable. 2 The Court's
answers here laid the groundwork for both the "continuity of interest"
doctrine and for the question of what constitutes a "security" for pur-
poses of the statute.
As to the first question-whether the transaction constituted a re-
organization-the transaction appeared at first blush to meet the literal
terms of the statute. Thus the answer to the first question appeared to
be "yes." The statute at that time defined a reorganization as "a
merger or consolidation (including the acquisition by one corporation of
at least a majority of the voting stock and at least a majority of the total
number of shares of all other classes of stock of another corporation, or
substantially all the properties of another corporation).""29 Because the
purchaser-Florida West Coast Ice Company-acquired substantially
all of Pinellas Ice Company's assets, the transaction appeared to be a
reorganization under the statutory definition.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that there was no reorgani-
zation' 30-the answer to the first question was "no." The Court rea-
soned that
the mere purchase for money of the assets of one Company
by another . . . has no real semblance to a merger or con-
solidation. Certainly, we think that to be within the exemp-
tion the seller must acquire an interest in the affairs of the
purchasing company more definite than that incident to
ownership of its short-term purchase-money notes11
127 See id. §§ 202-203, 44 Stat. at 12-14.
128 See Pinellas, 287 U.S. at 468-70.
129 Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 203(h)(1), 44 Stat. 11, 14, dted in Pinellas,
287 U.S. at 466.
130 See Pinellas, 287 U.S. at 469.
131 Id. at 470.
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The Court suggested that to hold otherwise would encourage tax eva-
sion. 82 The Court, therefore, read into the statute a requirement that
the seller obtain a definite interest in the affairs of the purchasing cor-
poration. For the Supreme Court, this marked the birth of the con-
tinuity of interest doctrine.
The extent of judicial lawmaking that the Pinellas Court under-
took in applying the term "reorganization" would be justified only to
avoid an absurd result or a result unacceptable on policy grounds. But
an absurd or otherwise unacceptable result would not have followed
had the Court found a reorganization to be present in Pinellas. Hold-
ing the transaction a reorganization would not have meant that the
transaction was tax free, since the Court also held that the short-term
notes were not securities. The Court found that "[tihese notes-mere
evidence of obligation to pay the purchase price-were not securities
within the intendment of the act and were properly regarded as the
equivalent of cash." 3' Since gain in connection with a reorganization is
recognized unless stock or securities are received, Pinellas Ice Com-
pany's entire gain would have been taxed even if there had been a
"creorganization."'
The Court's second holding did not involve the heavy judicial law-
making of the first. It is reasonable enough to regard notes with a four-
month term as not being securities of a corporation, since the word
"securities" generally connotes an instrument of longer term.
Thus, much less judicial interpretation would have been read into
the statute if the Court had held that (1) there was a reorganization,
but (2) the transaction was fully taxable because no securities had been
received. Presumably courts, even the Supreme Court, should attempt
to reach their results by putting as little gloss on the statute as possible.
In any event, not such dire consequences would have resulted if
the Court had found that the transaction was not taxable. The transac-
tion transferring the assets of the two ice companies to the Florida
West Coast Ice Company was closed on December 15, 1926.135 The
short-term notes came due at various times, none of them later than
April 1, 1927.136 If the transaction had been nontaxable in 1926, it
would have been taxable in 1927 when the Florida company paid fur-
ther cash and retired its notes. Thus, the extent of tax "evasion" that
132 See id.
183 Id. at 468-69.
14 See Griswold, "Securities" and "Continuity of Interest," 58 HARV. L. REv.
705, 706-10 (1945). Dean Griswold was on the brief in the Pinellas case. See 287 U.S.
at 463.
135 Pinellas, 287 U.S. at 464.
136 Id.
[Vol. 133:1335
TAXING CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS
could have occurred was a one-year deferral. Of course, if longer-term
notes had been used, the deferral would have been longer and thus
more objectionable. But longer-term notes would have been regarded as
securities, thus perhaps qualifying the transaction as a reorganization
and allowing for deferral of the taxpayer's gain on the notes. Hence, if
the Supreme Court had followed the literal language of the statute and
held the transaction not taxable, no great yawning chasm of tax defer-
ral or avoidance would have been opened.
Moreover, the above analysis indicates that no significant tax
avoidance was even being attempted by the taxpayer in Pinellas. As
pointed out above, the deferral that would have resulted if the taxpayer
had prevailed was one year. The transaction was closed on December
15, 1926.137 Presumably, it would have been possible to delay the clos-
ing until 1927, if there had been a major tax advantage to one of the
parties in so doing. There is certainly nothing in the opinion of the
Court to suggest that any particularly egregious tax avoidance or ad-
vantage was attempted in this case.
In choosing Pinellas to make a major interpretive decision on a
new statute, the Court chose a particularly weak case. The Court
should have waited until it was actually confronted with a case of tax
-avoidance. Because it did not, more was read into the statute than nec-
essary, and the clarity and consistency of the Court's future decisions in
this area suffered as a result. Notwithstanding the shaky bases on
which Pinellas rested, it gave birth to two major judicial lines of devel-
opment that continue to influence the law of reorganizations: the re-
quirement of a continuity of interest, and the definition of "security." If
Pinellas had been decided more soundly, the subsequent development
of the case law in the field of reorganizations almost certainly would
have been different."'
The Pinellas Court required the existence of a "continuity of in-
terest." However, since on the facts of the case the Court decided that a
continuity of interest was not present, it provided little information on
what facts would satisfy this requirement. Would "securities" in the
form of long-term bonds be enough, or was stock required?
The case of Helvering v. Minnesota Tea Co." 9 represented a ma-
jor development in this area of the law. The Minnesota Tea Company
transferred substantially all of its assets to Grand Union for $426,843
cash plus voting trust certificates representing 18,000 shares of Grand
137 Id.
138 Cf, e.g., Camp Wolters Enters. v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 737, 750-51 (1954)
(citing Pinellas in explaining which debt obligations can be termed "securities").
239 296 U.S. 378 (1935).
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Union stock.140 The Court, in an opinion by Justice McReynolds, held
that the transaction was a reorganization because "the seller acquired a
definite and substantial interest in the purchaser.""4 Although the
stock constituted only 55.85% of the value of the consideration, the
Court was willing to find a reorganization "so long as the taxpayer
received an interest in the affairs of the transferee which represented a
material part of the value of the transferred assets." 142
The significance of Minnesota Tea lies in its finding that a reor-
ganization had occurred despite the receipt of a substantial amount of
cash.148 In this respect, the Court's opinion was reminiscent of the
Steam case discussed above.1 44 After Minnnesota Tea, it was clearly
unnecessary to have 100% continuity of interest for a reorganization; at
least 55.85% would do. It should be borne in mind that this was done
with no statutory guidance whatsoever. The Court, with some help
from the Second Circuit, invented the continuity of interest doctrine in
Pinellas' 5 and then began to refine it and cut it back in Minnesota
Tea.
But the genie was out of the bottle. The Court, having created the
continuity of interest requirement, was now obliged to define its reach.
It began that process in John A. Nelson Co. v. Helvering,46 decided
along with Minnesota Tea. In this case, the Elliot-Fisher Corporation,
under an agreement with the Nelson Company, organized a new corpo-
ration with 30,000 shares of common stock and 12,500 shares of non-
voting preferred stock.1 47 Elliot-Fisher then transferred $2,000,000 in
cash to the new corporation in exchange for all of that corporation's
common stock.' 8 The Nelson Company then transferred substantially
all its property to the new corporation and in return received the
$2,000,000 in cash plus all the nonvoting preferred stock. The pre-
ferred stock constituted 38.46% of the consideration, with the balance in
cash.1
49
It might have been thought, based on the cases discussed above,
that this transaction would not qualify as a reorganization. While it
met the literal terms of the statute, in that there had been a transfer of
140 See id. at 381.
141 Id. at 386.
142 Id.
148 See id.
144 See supra text accompanying notes 66-72.
145 See supra text accompanying notes 122-38.
148 296 U.S. 374 (1935).
147 Id. at 376. The voting rights conferred by the preferred stock took effect only
in the event of a default on the preferred stock dividend. See id.
148 Id.
141 See R. PAUL, supra note 22, at 104.
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substantially all of the corporation's assets, the transaction seemed to
fall far short of the continuity of interest requirement defined in earlier
cases. Nonvoting preferred stock certainly confers a much weaker pro-
prietary interest than the 18,000 shares of common stock received by
the taxpayer in Minnesota Tea.
Nevertheless, the Court reversed the lower court and held that the
transaction constituted a reorganization. "0 Taking notice of Pinellas,
the Court found that
the seller acquire[d] a definite and substantial interest in the
affairs of the purchasing corporation . . . .The owner of
preferred stock is not without substantial interest in the af-
fairs of the issuing corporation, "although denied voting
rights. . . .A controlling interest in the transferee corpora-
tion is not made a requisite by [the provisions governing
reorganizations].1 51
Since nonvoting preferred stock passed muster, the question arose
whether long-term bonds would meet the continuity of interest require-
ment. This issue came up in an interesting form in Helvering v.
Watts.15 2 Watts was one of three shareholders of Ferro Alloys Corpo-
ration, all of whom exchanged their stock in Ferro Alloys for approxi-
mately $963,000 worth of stock in Vanadium Corporation of America
and $1,161,184 in mortgage bonds of Ferro Alloys.15 Thus, the stock
was about forty-five percent of the consideration, and the bonds were
the balance. The Court, citing Minnesota Tea, held'that the transaction
was a reorganization.'"
There are two ways of looking at the holding in Watts. Either the
Court viewed the stock and bonds together as being necessary to satisfy
the continuity of interest requirement, or it viewed the stock alone as
sufficient and the bonds as just tagged on. The closest the Court came
to answering that question was its statement that "[tihe bonds ...
were securities within the definition [of reorganization] and cannot be
regarded as cash, as were the short term notes . ..in [Pinellas]."1 5
That comment might have meant that as securities the bonds did help
fulfill the continuity of interest requirement. Or it might have meant
that the stock alone fulfilled the continuity of interest requirement, and
the bonds as securities were simply not taxable as cash, as were the
150 See 296 U.S. at 377.
151 Id.
.52 296 U.S. 387 (1935).
lBS Id. at 388.
I" See id. at 389.
155 Id.
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short-term notes in Pinellas.
Therefore, after Watts the question remained: Could bonds alone
satisfy the continuity of interest requirement? This issue arose in
LeTulle v. Scofield, 5 ' decided by the Supreme Court in 1940, five
years after Nelson, Minnesota Tea, and Watts. Letulle was the sole
stockholder of Gulf Coast Irrigation Company, the owner of irrigation
properties. 157 Pursuant to an agreement with the Gulf Coast Water
Company, LeTulle transferred property he personally owned to Gulf
Coast Irrigation, and then Gulf Coast Irrigation transferred substan-
tially all of its assets to Gulf Coast Water in exchange for $50,000 in
cash and $750,000 in Gulf Coast Water bonds, payable serially with
maturities ranging from about fourteen months through twelve years.1 58
The Court held-contrary to a series of earlier lower court deci-
sions applying Minnesota Tea, Nelson, and Watts,"59 -that the receipt
of bonds alone or bonds and cash did not confer a proprietary interest
on the transferor, and hence that the transaction was not a reorganiza-
tion. 6 The Court found that the bonds, even though secured solely by
the assets transferred, did not represent a proprietary stake sufficient to
establish a continuity of interest.16'
These early cases, ending with LeTulle, established the general
contours of the continuity of interest doctrine. It appeared from these
cases that continuity of interest required some form of equity considera-
tion, even if it was only nonvoting preferred stock. Long-term bonds by
themselves were not enough. Moreover, the doctrine required that some
minimum amount of equity-at least thirty-eight percent-be involved
in the transaction.
Since these early cases, the statute and the regulations have carried
the doctrine forward to the present. In particular, the Code and the
Treasury regulations set forth specific requirements for the percentage
' - 308 U.S. 415 (1940).
157 Id. at 416.
158 Id.
159 See, e.g., Burnham v. Commissioner, 86 F.2d 776 (7th Cir. 1936) (no loss
recognized on an exchange of promissory notes pursuant to a reorganization); Lilien-
thai v. Commissioner, 80 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1935) (stockholder who received cash and
bonds in exchange for stock under a reorganization plan not subject to tax on the
bonds); ef. Worcester Salt Co. v. Commissioner, 75 F.2d 251 (2d Cir. 1935) (parent
corporation's purchase of the assets of its wholly owned subsidiary in return for the
parent's bonds held not a reorganization, despite falling within the literal terms of the
statutory language).
160 See LeTulle, 308 U.S. at 420-21.
See id. During this period the Supreme Court also held that assumption of the
transferor's liabilities and payment thereof was taxable boot and did not contribute to
meeting the continuity of interest requirement. See United States v. Hendler, 303 U.S.
564, 566-67 (1938).
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of stock that must be received as consideration in stock-for-stock (Type
B) and stock-for-assets (Type C) reorganizations. l 2 Cases, regulations,
and rulings continue to govern the level of equity required as consider-
ation in a Type A merger or consolidation. A Fifth Circuit opinion, for
example, held that a merger or consolidation in which equity was less
than one percent of the total consideration did not qualify for treatment
as a reorganization. 6 s On the other hand, the Internal Revenue Service
will rule favorably if at least fifty percent of the aggregate consideration
received is stock,16 and courts have held that less than fifty percent
may be sufficient.165 Furthermore, there have been a variety of refine-
ments in the continuity of interest doctrine, many of which have become
quite technical.166
Curiously, the doctrine has also come to include the requirement
that there be continuity of shareholder identity before and after the
transaction 16 -a requirement not included in the classic continuity of
interest doctrine. The doctrine has also spawned the related doctrine of
continuity of the business enterprise involved in the transaction. 6  De-
182 For example, all of the consideration in a stock-for-stock reorganization must
be voting stock. See I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(B) (1982). In return for this consideration, the
acquiring firm must obtain "control," which is generally defined as "the ownership of
stock possessing at least 80 percent of the total combined voting power of all classes of
stock entitled to vote and at least 80 percent of the total number of shares of all other
classes of stock of the corporation." I.R.C. § 368(c)(1) (West Supp. 1985). Similarly
specific requirements apply to the stock-for-assets reorganization. See I.R.C.
§ 368(a)(1)(C), (a)(2)(B) (1982); Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(d), T.D. 6152, 1955-2 I.R.B.
61, 202; see also infra text accompanying notes 279-324.
18 See Southwest Natural Gas Co. v. Commissioner, 189 F.2d 332, 335 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 860 (1951).
184 See Rev. Proc. 77-37, § 3.02, 1977-2 C.B. 568, 569.
185 Compare, e.g., Nelson, 296 U.S. 374, 376 (38% enough) and Miller v. Com-
missioner, 84 F.2d 415, 418 (6th Cir. 1936) (25% enough) with Yoc Heating Corp. v.
Commissioner, 61 T.C. 168, 177 (1973) (15% not enough). In Kass v. Commissioner,
60 T.C. 218 (1973), affd mem., 491 F.2d 749 (3d Cir. 1974), Kass, a small minority,
stockholder in a corporation that was being merged into another firm, received stock in
the merged corporation in exchange for her stock in the disappearing corporation. Al-
though Kass received no cash in this transaction, other stockholders received a large
enough proportion of cash that the transaction as a whole did not satisfy the "con-
tinuity of interest" requirement. Kass therefore had taxable gain, even though she had
received no cash and the transaction was out of her control. See Kass, 60 T.C. at 227;
see also Wolfman, "Continuity of Interest" and The American Law Institute Study,
57 TAxEs 840, 842 (1979). For further discussion of Kass, see infra text accompanying
notes 393-94.
188 See generally Hutton, Musings on Continuity of Interest-Recent Develop-
ments, 56 TAXEs 904 (1978).
187 See Rev. Proc. 77-37, § 3.02, 1977-2 C.B. 568, 569 (indicating that sales,
redemptions, and other dispositions of stock occurring prior or subsequent to the ex-
change will be considered in determining whether the continuity of interest requirement
is satisfied).
118 See Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b), (d), T.D. 7745, 1981-1 C.B. 134, 140-41 (ef-
fective for acquisitions occurring after Jan. 30, 1981). These rules provide in general
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spite, or perhaps because of, such refinements over the course of its
relatively long history, the continuity of interest doctrine presents a
number of still unresolved problems.
b. Current Issues
i. Required Period of Continuity
One major unresolved question is whether there is any particular
time period, before and after the reorganization, during which the req-
uisite continuity of interest must exist. This question is important be-
cause in many cases the transferor may have an intention or commit-
ment to dispose of the stock in the acquiring corporation soon after it is
received.
Such was the case in McDonald's Restaurants v. Commis-
sioner,169 in which the McDonald's Corporation bought the operations
of one of its franchisees in a statutory merger under Delaware law.
1
7
0
The sellers, the Garb-Stern group, wanted all cash as their considera-
tion. McDonald's, however, wanted to give all stock, so it could take
advantage of "pooling of interests" accounting.171 As a compromise, the
parties agreed that McDonald's would give all stock but would include
the stock in a registration and sale of stock to the public planned for six
months thereafter, so that the Garb-Stern group could get cash for their
stock. 17 2 The Garb-Stern group could choose in the alternative to par-
that the acquiring corporation, P, can satisfy the "continuity of business enterprise"
requirement by satisfying either one of two tests: (i) continuing T's historic business or
(ii) using a significant portion of T's historic business assets in a business.
The "historic business" test is deemed to be satisfied by the regulations if P con-
tinues T's previous business. If T has more than one line of business, the test requires
only that P continue a significant line of T's business. A corporation's historic business
is the business that it has conducted most recently, not a business that the corporation
enters into as part of the plan of reorganization itself. T cannot suddenly go into a
business consistent with that of its prospective parent, P, just to satisfy the rules gov-
erning continuity of business enterprise.
The asset continuity test is satisfied if P uses a significant portion of T's historic
business assets in a business-whether or not it is the business in which T used the
assets. In addition to stock and securities, T's business assets may include intangible
operating assets such as good will, patents, and trademarks, whether or not they have a
tax basis. For five examples of the application of these rules, see id.
169 688 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1982).
170 See id. at 523.
"Pooling of interests" accounting, for these purposes, involves retaining the
historical bases of the acquired business's assets. In addition, income of the acquired
corporation is included in the combined corporation's income for prior fiscal periods as
well as the period in which the combination occurs. See id. at 521 n.2.
172 Id. at 521-22. If the stock that the Garb-Stern group received had remained
unregistered, it could have been sold only pursuant to SEC Rule 144, 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.144 (1984), which provides that unregistered stock sold pursuant to a private
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ticipate in any later registration and sale of stock that McDonald's
might initiate during the following six years."7" The group could also
choose not to sell its stock at all, although it fully expected to do so. In
fact, six months after the sale, and in the same taxable year as the sale,
McDonald's registered and sold a new issue of stock. The Garb-Stern
group "piggy-backed" its shares in that sale and thus ultimately wound
up with cash.' 4
At issue in the case was the tax basis of the assets for purposes of
depreciation in the hands of McDonald's. Because of the particular
facts, the Commissioner and taxpayers transposed their customary posi-
tions. The Commissioner argued that a reorganization was present and
that a low carryover basis should therefore be used. 7 McDonald's ar-
gued that the merger for stock and the sale by the Garb-Stern group of
all of its stock for cash six months later should be treated as one trans-
action, thereby defeating continuity of interest. 17  The Court held in
favor of McDonald's. Thus the sale for cash by the Garb-Stern group
broke post-reorganization continuity. 77
This discussion leaves unanswered the question of how long after
the reorganization the stock must be held in order to maintain con-
tinuity of interest. In one ruling the IRS suggested that five years of
unrestricted ownership will ordinarily be sufficient to establish post-
reorganization continuity. 78 However, that ruling involved special cir-
placement must be held for two years, and after that can be sold only in amounts
limited to the lesser of one percent of the shares or the average weekly reported volume
of trading in such securities on all securities exchanges during the four calendar weeks
preceding the sale. See id. § 230.144(d)(1), (e)(2).
173 McDonald's, 688 F.2d at 522. The Garb-Stem group also had a right to de-
mand registration in the event that McDonald's did not undertake a registration and
sale within one year of the transaction. Id.
174 Id.
175 See id. at 523 (referring to the basis treatment of acquired assets in a reorgani-
zation under I.R.C. § 362(b) (1982)).
178 See 688 F.2d at 524.
177 The court agreed with the Tax Court's determination that the transactions
should be combined-stepped together-under the "end result" and "interdependence"
tests: two out of the three tests generally used for determining the applicability of the
step transaction doctrine. Even under the most restrictive '.binding commitment" test,
the court felt that the transactions might very well be stepped together, given the fact
that it was an essential element of the agreement that the Garb-Stem group could force
McDonald's to register and sell its stock. See id. at 524-25.
178 See Rev. Rul. 66-23, 1966-1 C.B. 67, 68. In Revenue Ruling 66-23, the IRS
found that a seven-year period of unrestricted ownership was sufficient to establish
post-reorganization continuity of interest. In reaching this conclusion, however, the IRS
also noted that a five-year period would "ordinarily" be sufficient. Id. The Service has
since cited this ruling in support of a five-year test. See Rev. Rul. 78-142, 1978-1 C.B.
111, 113 (ruling that receipt of mandatory serial redemptions of preferred stock in a
reorganization did not violate continuity of interest where such redemptions could not
commence until five years after the reorganization). The IRS has also stated that in its
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cumstances: the taxpayer, for antitrust reasons, was under a court order
to dispose of the stock received in a merger within seven years. More-
over, the Commissioner stated in the ruling that even if the taxpayer
disposed of some or all of the stock within five years, the status of the
reorganization would not be affected, because at the time of the reor-
ganization the taxpayer had no preconceived plan or arrangement to
sell the sharesY.'9 Thus, while five years is a safe harbor in this area,
even less than five years of post-reorganization continuity might suffice
if there is no preconceived plan or arrangement to dispose of the stock
at the time of the reorganization. There is, however, considerable un-
certainty about this question; the cases and rulings have not clearly de-
fined the circumstances under which periods of less than five years will
establish a continuity of interest.
ii. Arbitrage
Arbitrage activity in acquisitions involving publicly held compa-
nies can raise both post-reorganization and pre-reorganization con-
tinuity problems. The IRS has stated that in its rulings it will take into
account sales, redemptions, and other dispositions of stock occurring
prior to the exchange.' 80 The question is whether this covers the activi-
ties of arbitrageurs' whose transactions in the stock of a target com-
pany are not part of the plan of reorganization.
The Senate Finance Committee's Preliminary Staff Report on the
Income Taxation of Corporations' 82 points out that, despite the Ser-
vice's statement that for ruling purposes pre-reorganization turnover of
stock ownership could undermine continuity of interest, there are no
cases holding that arbitrage activity destroys pre-reorganization con-
rulings it will take into account sales, redemptions, and other dispositions of stock that
are "part of the plan of reorganization," whether "prior or subsequent to the ex-
change." Rev. Proc. 77-37, 1977-2 C.B. 568, 569.
179 See Rev. Rul. 66-23, 1966-1 C.B. 67, 68.
180 See supra note 178.
181 In general, arbitrageurs in corporate acquisitions analyze announced takeovers
and then, if the situation looks attractive, take a position that will be profitable if the
transaction goes through. For example, in a transaction in which the parent offers
stock, buying the stock of the target and selling short the stock of the parent will insu-
late the arbitrageur from market risk and allow her to win or lose based on the results
of the transaction. Where the transaction is for cash, arbitrageurs will hedge their mar-
ket risk in other ways, for example by buying puts on a market index. The players in
the sophisticated arbitrage game generally are the leading investment banking firms.
See G. WYSER-PRATTE, RiSK ARBITRAGE II 4 (Monograph Ser. in Fin. & Econ. No.
3-4, 1982).
'8' STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 98TH CONG., 1ST SESS., PRELIMI-
NARY REPORT ON THE REFORM AND SIMPLIFICATION OF THE INCOME TAXATION OF
CORPORATIONS 30 (Comm. Print 1983) [hereinafter cited as PRELIMINARY REPORT].
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tinuity, even though arbitrage is common in takeovers involving pub-
licly held companies."' 3 The Preliminary Report suggests that arbi-
trageurs frequently acquire as much as ninety percent of the target's
stock and that this type of activity is a serious problem in the continuity
of interest area.
18 4
The committee staff has, however, misapprehended the relation-
ship of arbitrage activities to continuity of interest theory. First, a high
proportion of acquisitions-those conducted solely for cash-do not
raise continuity of interest issues."8 5 Second, even where the considera-
tion is stock, once the transaction is consummated arbitrageurs are usu-
ally quick to dispose of their newly received stock in the parent in order
to realize their profits and free their capital (most of which is bor-
rowed) for the next transaction.'8 6 Thus, the arbitrageurs will be taxed
in full on the transaction,18 7 whether or not the transaction is taxable to
the other shareholders of the target. Therefore, if the activity of the
arbitrageurs destroys continuity of interest, the other shareholders, not
the arbitrageurs, will suffer the consequences.
This raises the question of how much pre- or post-reorganization
arbitrage there must be in order to create continuity of interest
problems for the other shareholders. There are three possible ap-
proaches to this problem.
First, it could be said that arbitrage activity before or after the
reorganization is simply not a problem at all. A very large turnover of
stock prior to the reorganization should not affect continuity of interest.
The stock is still outstanding and still held by investors who will re-
ceive appropriate consideration for their stock in the reorganization.
This would be consistent with the historical development of the con-
tinuity of interest doctrine, discussed above, wherein the focus was on
the nature of the consideration received in the reorganization, not the
changes in the stock ownership before or after the reorganization." 8
Indeed, the IRS has apparently taken this approach, inasmuch as there
are no cases or rulings that have held that arbitrage activity before or
183 See id.
18 See id.
18 For a general idea of the proportion of cash transactions, see U.S. Mergers
and Acquisitions, MERGERS & AcQusrsmoNs, Spring 1984, at RI-R57 (setting forth
prices and terms of completed mergers, acquisitions, and divestitures reported in the
fourth quarter of 1983).
188 This hasty exit by the arbitrageurs customarily depresses the post-reorganiza-
tion price of the parent. See Post Merger Selling Pressure, VALUE LINE MERGER
EVALUATION SERVICE, May 5, 1969, at 1.
17 In general, the arbitrageurs, as dealers in securities, would be taxed at ordi-
nary income rates. See I.R.C. § 1236(a) (1982 & West Supp. 1985).
188 See supra text accompanying notes 118-68.
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after the reorganization destroyed continuity of interest."8 9
Nevertheless, the Preliminary Report suggests that a large amount
of pre-reorganization arbitrage should break continuity of interest.1 90
In support of this position, the Report cites Revenue Procedure 77-
37,91 which states in part that
[t]he "continuity of interest" requirement of section 1.368-
1(b) of the Income Tax Regulations is satisfied if there is
continuing interest through stock ownership in the acquiring
or transferee corporation . . . on the part of the former
shareholders of the acquired or transferor corporation which
is equal in value, as of the effective date of the reorganiza-
tion, to at least 50 percent of the value of all of the formerly
outstanding stock of the acquired or transferor corporation as
of the same date. It is not necessary that each shareholder of
the acquired or transferor corporation receive in the ex-
change stock of the acquiring or transferee corporation, or a
corporation in "control" thereof, which is equal in value to
at least 50 percent of the value of his former stock interest in
the acquired or transferor corporation, so long as one or
more of the shareholders of the acquired or transferor corpo-
ration have a continuing interest through stock ownership in
the acquiring or transferee corporation . . .which is, in the
aggregate, equal in value to at least 50 percent of the value
of all of the formerly outstanding stock of the acquired or
transferor corporation. Sales, redemptions, and other disposi-
tions of stock occurring prior or subsequent to the exchange
which are part of the plan of reorganization will be consid-
ered in determining whether there is a 50 percent continuing
interest through stock ownership as of the effective date of
the reorganization. 92
It is clear from this quotation that with respect to pre-reorganization
activity the IRS is primarily concerned with the nature of the consider-
ation to be received by the shareholders of the acquired or transferor
corporation, rather than pre- or post-reorganization trading activity in
the stock of the acquired or transferor corporation. This is, of course,
entirely consistent with the historical development of the continuity of
'89 See supra text accompanying note 183.
'90 PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 182, at 30 (describing the Service's treat-
ment of arbitrage activity and asking the question, "If continuity of interest is impor-
tant after an acquisition, why should it be effectively irrelevant before?").
191 1977-2 C.B. 568.
192 Id. at 569.
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interest doctrine. In the McDonald's case,"' for example, the court
held that subsequent sales of the stock received as consideration by the
shareholders of the acquired corporation broke continuity of interest
when the subsequent sales were for cash and were part of an overall
integrated plan by the selling shareholders."" Had those subsequent
sales not been made pursuant to an integrated plan, however, the court
probably would have held that continuity of interest was maintained.
Thus, it would be consistent with the historical development of the
continuity of interest doctrine to hold that pre- and post-reorganization
turnover of stock ownership, of the kind that is customarily engaged in
by arbitrageurs, does not destroy continuity of interest. This, in fact,
seems to be the Service's position.
A second approach to the question of the effect of arbitrage on
continuity of interest is to go to the other extreme and say that any
sales of stock before or after the reorganization are counted against con-
tinuity of interest. Thus, in a Type B reorganization, for example,
where only voting stock may be used as consideration,1 95 it could be
said that any turnover in stock ownership of the target before or after
the reorganization, whether due to arbitrage or other transactions, and
whether or not part of the plan of reorganization, would destroy con-
tinuity of interest. This hardly seems like an appropriate result: it is
not at all consistent with the historical development of continuity of
interest doctrine, and there is no current authority to support it. Thus,
this approach may be dismissed with confidence.
The third approach is to apply the well-established fifty percent
test to the question of how much turnover in stock ownership, whether
due to arbitrage or other transactions, may occur before or after the
reorganization. In effect, this would set up a two-track continuity of
interest test: a continuity of interest test related to nature of considera-
tion (the traditional test) and a continuity of interest test related to
turnover in stock ownership. For example, in a Type B reorganization,
the statute itself insures that the "nature of consideration" test is met
by requiring that the consideration be solely voting stock. The turnover
test might impose a maximum of fifty percent turnover in stock owner-
ship with respect to the shareholders of the target before or after the
reorganization. Thus a Type B reorganization in which the considera-
tion was solely voting stock and in which there was a forty percent
turnover in stock ownership due to arbitrage would be a valid
reorganization.
193 See supra text accompanying notes 169-77.
'" See McDonald's, 688 F.2d at 25.
'" See I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(B) (1982).
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This third alternative may sound complex or unlikely to be imple-
mented, but in fact there is some evidence that the Service is following
it. In a 1979 letter ruling,"9" the Service dealt with a proposed reverse
triangular Type A reorganization, 197 a transaction that, like the Type
B reorganization, requires the acquiring corporation to obtain at least
eighty percent of the target corporation's stock.' 98 This requirement as-
sured that the historical continuity of interest test was easily met with
respect to the nature of the consideration. However, the IRS stated as
one of its further conditions for issuing a favorable advance ruling that
the parties have no knowledge of any intention on the part of the share-
holders to turn over more than fifty percent of their ownership of the
stock after the reorganization.19 This letter ruling thus evidences a
two-track approach to continuity of interest: there must be the proper
type of consideration, and the contemplated turnover in share owner-
ship must be limited to fifty percent.
The implications of these three approaches for the activities of
arbitrageurs are fairly clear. If the first approach is taken, even exten-
sive activities by arbitrageurs, either before or after the reorganization,
would not create a continuity of interest problem, since arbitrage activi-
ties are not normally a part of the overall plan of reorganization.
Under the second approach, the consequences of arbitrage activity
would vary depending on the type of reorganization. With the Type A
reorganization, there could be up to fifty percent share turnover;
200
with Type B, there could be none;2' and with Type C, there could be
up to twenty percent.2"2 Although it may be illogical to have the rules
on share turnover depend on the type of reorganization employed,
straight logic has never been a long suit in this field.
The third approach, which is probably the approach that the Ser-
vice will follow, yields a more reasonable result. It allows up to fifty
percent share turnover after (and presumably also before) the reorgani-
zation, regardless of the type of reorganization. As pointed out above,
this is the approach that the Preliminary Report seems to assume. If
this approach is taken, however, then the committee staff's concern
about the activities of arbitrageurs seems misplaced. The data suggest
2" IRS Private Letter Ruling No. 7926032 (Mar. 28, 1979) (available July 1,
1985, on WESTLAW, FTX-WD database).
197 For a brief description of this type of reorganization, see infra text following
note 298.
19 See I.R.C. § 368(a)(2)(E)(ii), (c) (1982 & West Supp. 1985).
199 See IRS Private Letter Ruling No. 7926032, supra note 196.
200 See Rev. Proc. 77-37, § 3.02, 1977-2 C.B. 568, 569.
201 See supra text accompanying and following note 195.
210 See I.R.C. § 368(a)(2)(B)(iii) (1982).
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that, although the activities of arbitrageurs are widely publicized from
time to time,203 arbitrageurs rarely acquire more than thirty percent of
a target company's stock.2 " Indeed, their proportional ownership may
be considerably lower in extremely large takeovers, in which institu-
tions tend to have major holdings.2"5 Thus, under the third approach,
Congress would not need to ,fashion new legislation dealing with arbi-
trage activity: the activities of arbitrageurs would rarely rise to the level
necessary to destroy continuity of interest.
iii. Use of the Parent's Stock-The Groman Doctrine
If a corporation wishes to acquire another corporation tax free us-
ing one of the three basic acquisitive techniques, it may wish to give
stock of its controlling parent as consideration, instead of its own stock.
Would this qualify as good consideration for continuity of interest pur-
poses? In the leading case on this question of remote continuity, the
203 See, e.g., Dorfman, Gambling on Certainties, FORBES, May 24, 1982, at 172;
Welles, Inside the Arbitrage Game, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Aug. 1981, at 41;
Metz, Use of Inside Data in the Takeover Game Is Pervasive and Can Lead To Huge
Profit, Wall St. J., Mar. 2, 1984, at 12, col. 1; Salomon May Gain About $5.6 Million
in Columbia Merger, Wall St. J., Apr. 13, 1982, at 40, col. 3; Goldman Sachs Sees
Value of Interest in Outlet Co. Fall, Wall St. J., Feb. 2, 1982, at 52, col. 4; Noble,
Playing the Game of Arbitrage, N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1981, § 3, at 14, col. 2.
2'4 See Metz, supra note 203, at 12, col. 2 (indicating that 30% is generally the
maximum proportion of shares of the target held by arbitrageurs).
205 See, e.g., Metz, In Battle for Conoco, Takeover Speculators Can Do Little
More than Watch the Action, Wall St. J., July 31, 1981, at 21, col. 4 (describing a
major takeover battle in which arbitrageurs held only about 14% of the stock of the
target, compared to 62% held by institutions and 24% held by individuals).
Tracing the ownership of stock for these purposes is not wholly free from difficul-
ties. As a result of the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89
Stat. 97 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77-78, 80 (1980)), which had as one of its goals the
facilitation of a national market system for securities, see id. § 11(A)(a)(1), 89 Stat. at
111-12, the proportion of stock certificates held by nominees has increased dramati-
cally. Moreover, there may be two or more levels of nominees. For example, an indi-
vidual owner of 100 shares of IBM stock may leave it to be held by and in the name of
her broker. The broker, however, might not hold the certificates itself; it might leave
them in the possession and name of one of the three securities depositories-The De-
pository Trust Company, the Midwest Securities Trust Company, or the Pacific Secur-
ities Depository Trust Company-that act as custodians of securities deposited by par-
ticipating institutions for their own accounts or for the accounts of others. Moreover,
many institutions, especially banks, participate in a depository through a correspondent
relationship established with another institution-so-called "piggybacking." See SECuR-
ITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, IMPROVING COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN ISSU-
ERS AND BENEFICIAL OWNERS OF NOMINEE HELD SECURITIES 6-8 (June 1982).
Thus, ascertaining owners of the stock of a target in a takeover setting for purposes of
calculating continuity of interest can involve the substantial task of penetrating nominee
holder records. The IRS would have authority to undertake such an investigation
through its administrative summons procedure. See I.R.C. § 7602(a) (1982). See gener-
ally D. POSIN, supra note 17, at 433-35 (describing IRS administrative procedures).
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Supreme Court surprisingly answered "no." In Groman v. Commis-
sioner,20 6 the acquiring corporation received the assets of the target in
exchange for consideration consisting of the acquiring corporation's
nonvoting preferred stock, its parent's nonvoting preferred stock, and
cash.207 The Supreme Court held that, although the transaction still
constituted a reorganization under the applicable law of that time, the
parent's stock could not be counted for continuity of interest purposes
and was therefore taxable.208 In the companion case of Helvering v.
Bashford,20 9 the Supreme Court reached the same conclusion on simi-
lar facts.210
These were two of the later decisions of the Brandeis wing of the
Court, which tended to use whatever grounds it could to find taxability
in reorganization cases.2 11 The Groman and Bashford cases appear in-
defensible from a doctrinal standpoint. If the stock of the acquiring cor-
poration confers continuity of interest, then the stock of the parent of
the acquiring corporation should also confer continuity, at least where,
as in Groman, the parent owns 100% of the acquiring corporation.
The Groman-Bashford doctrine has since been modified by statute
to allow the stock of the parent of the acquiring corporation to be used
to qualify for continuity of interest purposes, but only if no stock of the
acquiring corporation is used.212 Where stock of both the parent and
the subsidiary is used, there can still be serious problems with meeting
the continuity of interest requirements, and the transaction may not
qualify for nonrecognition treatment. Thus, shades of Groman-
Bashford still linger.213
2- 302 U.S. 82 (1937).
207 See id. at 83. Of course, there was no question that the cash portion of the
transaction was taxable. See id. at 85.
208 See id. at 89-90.
20" 302 U.S. 454 (1938).
210 See id. at 458. In Bashford the parent directly acquired the stock of the
targets, and then immediately transferred the stock to a newly formed subsidiary. See
id. at 455-56.
211 See supra text accompanying notes 39-79.
212 See I.R.C. § 368(a)(2)(D) (1982).
212 The current law in this area can be described in a little more detail. In a Type
B reorganization, the stock of the parent may be used to satisfy the continuity of inter-
est requirement. If it is so used, the stock of the subsidiary that is acquiring the assets
may not be used at all, either to count for the continuity of interest requirement or as
boot, inasmuch as the statute requires that "solely" voting stock of the parent may be
used as consideration in the transaction. See I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(B) (1982).
In a Type C reorganization, the stock of the parent may be used to satisfy the
continuity of interest requirement. If it is so used, the stock of the subsidiary that is
acquiring the assets may not be counted toward satisfying the continuity of interest
requirement. In this circumstance, the stock of the acquiring corporation would be con-
sidered as boot in the transaction, which could constitute up to 20% of the considera-
tion. See I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(C), (a)(2)(B) (1982).
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It appears that the major consequence of the Groman and
Bashford cases is to help make the reorganization provisions optional
in their application. By using consideration that includes stock of both
parent and subsidiary (and the subsidiary may be formed just for this
purpose), a transaction that is still entirely for stock can be rendered
partially or completely taxable.214
c. Critique
As the discussion above has indicated, the continuity of interest
doctrine, given its expression in the statute itself, the cases, and the
regulations and rulings of the Treasury Department, is the glue that
holds the reorganization field together. Despite the doctrine's impor-
tance, however, its treatment by the courts and the IRS has made very
little sense.
The fundamental requirement of the continuity of interest doctrine
is that the transferor of assets receive a substantial amount of equity as
consideration. The receipt of the equity presumably leads the transferor
to maintain a continuing proprietary interest in her transferred assets.
Only then does she merit the holy grail of nontaxability. But only eq-
uity carries the essential genes for continuity of interest. Any equity,
even nonvoting preferred stock, will do.215 At the same time it is
equally clear from the case law that debt is not sufficient for this pur-
pose.216 Even long-term bonds, secured by the property transferred, are
In a Type A reorganization, stock of the parent may be used to satisfy the con-
tinuity of interest requirement. In that case, no stock of the acquiring corporation may
be used without disqualifying the transaction entirely from reorganization status. See
I.R.C. § 368(a)(2)(D) (1982). For further discussion of the Groman doctrine, see
Lurie, Namorg-or Groman Reversed, 10 TAX L. REv. 119, 120-34 (1954).
214 There might be several reasons why the parties would want to avoid treatment
of the transaction as a tax-free reorganization. For example, the acquiring corporation
may desire to step up the basis of the acquired assets for depreciation purposes. Simi-
larly, the stockholders of the target corporation may have losses on holdings that they
would like to reorganize.
Take the case, for example, where P Corporation desires to effect what would be a
Type A reorganization or statutory merger with T. For business or financial account-
ing reasons, the parties desire the consideration to be entirely stock, yet the parties also
desire that the transaction be taxable. To avoid nontaxability, P Corporation forms a
subsidiary, S, and T Corporation is merged into S in exchange for consideration con-
sisting of 70% P stock and 30% S stock. Under these conditions, the transaction is
completely disqualified from reorganization treatment, despite being entirely for stock,
and is taxable in full. See I.R.C. § 368(a)(2)(D) (1982).
215 See, e.g., John A. Nelson Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 374, 377 (1935) ("The
owner of preferred stock is not without substantial interest in the affairs of the issuing
corporation, although denied voting rights."). There is some talk that the IRS is consid-
ering not ruling on whether nonvoting preferred stock can be counted for continuity of
interest purposes, but this position has not been formally announced or adopted.
216 See, e.g., Pinellas, 287 U.S. at 470 (involving short-term purchase money
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inadequate. 217 Drawing the distinction on these grounds simply makes
no sense.
Consider a small automobile parts manufacturing firm, with one
stockholder (an individual) A. The firm is acquired by General Motors
solely in exchange for voting stock. Since A receives only General Mo-
tors voting stock, she would meet the continuity of interest requirement,
and the transaction would not be taxable to her. Yet A would have far
less than one percent of General Motors stock. In what sense can A be
said to be in any "continuity of proprietary interest" with her old auto-
mobile parts company? The fortunes of that little business are simply a
drop in the bucket compared to the rest of the General Motors opera-
tions. A is now just an investor who owns General Motors stock, an
extremely liquid investment.
Suppose in the alternative that A sold her business to individual B,
who formed corporation X for the purpose of making the purchase. A
receives as sole consideration fifteen-year bonds of X, secured by the
assets of her transferred business. B holds all the stock of X. Is A not
more personally concerned with the fortunes of her former business in
this case than when she sold her business to General Motors? Are not
the results of her holdings in the bonds much more inti-nately tied to
the fortunes of her former business than to her ownership of less than
one percent of General Motors stock? Indeed, the bonds will fluctuate
in value depending on the success or failure of X's business.
Moreover, it is undoubtedly much more difficult to sell the bonds
of this closely held corporation than it is to sell the stock of General
Motors-demonstrating yet another way in which the results of A's
investment are inextricably tied to the fortunes of her old business.
Where she owns General Motors stock, A is but one phone call to her
broker away from completely severing whatever infinitesimal connec-
tion she still has with her old automobile parts business. Yet under the
continuity of interest doctrine, A qualifies for nontaxability on her sale
to General Motors, whereas in the second transaction A, not having
any equity, does not have a continuity of proprietary interest, and the
selling of her assets for X Company bonds is undoubtedly taxable to
her.
218
notes).
217 See LeTulle, 308 U.S. at 421.
218 Cf. Roebling v. Commissioner, 143 F.2d 810, 813-14 (3d Cir. 1944). In Roeb-
ling, the taxpayer, pursuant to an "agreement of merger," exchanged stock in a public
utility on which he received dividends derived from the rental of the utility's property,
payable at a fixed eight percent rate. Id. at 811. On the merger of the utility into
another utility, taxpayer received 100-year bonds with a fixed eight percent return and
was therefore held not to meet the continuity of interest requirement, despite the fact
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These anomalous results-occurring regardless of whether the
transaction is structured as a merger, a stock-for-stock acquisition, or a
stock-for-assets acquisition-grow out of the faulty steps taken in the
early cases. In the first two cases, Cortland Specialty219 and Pinel-
las,220 no continuity of interest was found. In both cases it was argued
that the transaction was within the literal terms of the reorganization
statute.221 Nevertheless, it was reasonable for the Second Circuit and
the Supreme Court to conclude that the transactions were basically
sales, since the consideration involved consisted of short-term notes, 222 a
type of consideration clearly not within the contemplation of the non-
recognition provisions of the statute. Unfortunately, neither court rested
its holding on a simple factual analysis. Rather, both courts used rea-
soning that came, thereafter, to be known as the continuity of interest
doctrine. It is significant that in neither of these cases was it suggested
that equity as consideration was the necessary and sufficient condition
to qualify for nonrecognition.
The focus of subsequent decisions came to be not on whether the
facts of the case demonstrated that the taxpayer had in effect sold out
her business, but rather on whether there was a "continuity of inter-
est." With the decisions in the subsequent cases of Minnesota Tea,223
Nelson,224 Watts, 225 and finally LeTulle, 22 the test became formalistic.
The test was not whether the transaction on its facts looked like a sale,
but rather whether there was a certain minimum amount of equity pre-
sent in the consideration.
The continuity of interest doctrine therefore does not lead to rea-
sonable results. It defies logic not to tax one who sells a small business
to General Motors for less than one percent of General Motors stock
but, instead, to tax one who sells a small business to a small company
and receives long-term bonds secured by the assets. Notwithstanding
the illogic of the doctrine, it has held the law of this field together for
more than fifty years, and it may not be easy to eradicate.227
that his economic position was virtually unchanged. See id.
219 See supra text accompanying notes 118-21.
220 See supra text accompanying notes 122-38.
221 See Pinellas, 287 U.S. at 467-68; Cortland Specialty, 60 F.2d at 939.
222 See Pinellas, 287 U.S. at 464; Cortland Specialty, 60 F.2d at 938.
223 See supra text accompanying notes 139-45.
224 See supra text accompanying notes 146-51.
225 See supra text accompanying notes 152-55.
226 See supra text accompanying notes 156-58.
217 See infra text accompanying notes 388-95.
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d. Recent Development: The Paulsen Case
Despite theoretical and policy infirmities, the continuity of interest
doctrine, as developed by the early Supreme Court cases, has appeared
to be a reasonably predictable test for ascertaining the taxability of cor-
porate acquisitions. Thus, it was surprising that the recent Supreme
Court case of Paulsen v. Commissioner22 presented such substantial
difficulties.
Paulsen, at first glance, appears to be a case of limited signifi-
cance to continuity of interest theory, since it involves the specialized
concerns raised in connection with the merger of savings and loan as-
sociations.229 However, the Court's approach in Paulsen may have
opened a Pandora's box of problems in the continuity of interest area
with respect to hybrid securities. Paulsen is therefore a case of great
consequence for this field and merits examination.
The Paulsens owned 17,459 shares of guaranty stock in the Com-
merce Savings and Loan Association, a state-chartered institution.2 30 As
a result of the merger of Commerce into Citizens Federal Savings and
Loan Association, a federally chartered mutual savings and loan associ-
ation that was not authorized to issue capital stock,"' the Paulsens ex-
changed their stock in Commerce for passbook savings accounts and
time certificates of deposit in Citizens.2"2 The Paulsens did not report
their gain of approximately $153,000 on the transaction because they
believed it was a tax-free reorganization.233 The Court found that, al-
though the transaction met the literal terms of the statute,234 the trans-
action was nonetheless taxable, because the continuity of interest test
was not satisfied.
23 5
Upon superficial examination, the receipt of passbook savings ac-
counts and time certificates of deposit does not appear to satisfy the
continuity of interest test, since these items are cash equivalents. Never-
theless, as Justice O'Connor noted in her dissent in Paulsen, all courts
that had previously considered similar transactions had found that a
228 105 S. Ct. 627 (1985), afflg 716 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1983).
229 Mergers in this area present unique problems because of the inability of mu-
tual savings and loan associations to issue stock. See Note, Reorganization Treatment
of Acquisitions of Stock Savings and Loan Institutions by Mutual Savings and Loan
Associations, 52 FORDHAM L. REv. 1261, 1268-69 (1984).
230 105 S. Ct. at 629.
231 Id. at 631.
232 Id. at 629.
23S Id.
2" Id. at 630.
225 See id. at 632.
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continuity of interest existed.2"' The reasoning was that, although the
acquiring mutual savings and loan association could not issue stock,
savings accounts and certificates of deposit had sufficient equity charac-
teristics-such as the rights to vote and to receive undistributed pro-
ceeds upon liquidation-that their possession satisfied the continuity of
interest requirement. 37
In finding that there was no continuity of interest, Justice Rehn-
quist, writing for the Court, undertook a technical analysis. He pointed
out that the acquiring company, Citizens Federal, could not issue stock
but rather could raise capital only "by accepting payments on savings
accounts representing share interests in the association. '238 These
shares, which were divided into passbook accounts and certificates of
deposit, were hybrid securities, containing both debt and equity charac-
teristics. The equity characteristics that each share contained were the
following: part ownership interest in the assets; a right to vote; receipt
of dividends rather than interest; no right to a fixed return; and right to
a pro rata distribution of remaining assets on dissolution. 239 Rehnquist
argued that the equity characteristics were "not as substantial as they
appear[ed] on the surface.
240
The part ownership interest that each share carried was not con-
centrated but rather was "spread over all of the depositors. 241 Justice
Rehnquist concluded that the equity interest of each shareholder in re-
lation to the total value of the share was "much smaller than in a stock
association.
242
In the Court's view, the right to vote also was not significant. A
shareholder was limited to 400 votes, and therefore any funds deposited
in excess of $40,000 did not confer the right to additional votes. More-
over, since each borrower was entitled to vote, the right to vote was
further diluted each time a loan was made. Beyond that, depositors
generally signed proxies giving management the right to vote their
shares.243
The Paulsen opinion also denigrated the equity aspect of the right
to receive dividends. The Court pointed out that in practice Citizens
236 Id. at 634.
237 See, e.g., Capital Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 607 F.2d 970, 975-76
(Ct. Cl. 1979); West Side Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 494 F.2d 404, 411
(6th Cir. 1974); Everett v. United States, 448 F.2d 357, 360 (10th Cir. 1971), cited in
Paulsen, 105 S. Ct. at 628.
28 105 S. Ct. at 631.
239 Id.
240 Id.
241 Id.
242 Id.
243 Id.
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paid a fixed, preannounced dividend rate on all accounts, in order to be
able to compete with other savings and loan associations and commer-
cial banks. 244 Moreover, the accounts were insured by the Federal Sav-
ings and Loan Insurance Corporation, and the dividends were treated
by the Internal Revenue Code like interest on bank accounts rather
than like dividends on stock. The dividends were deductible to Citizens
and did not qualify for the dividend exclusion under section 116 of the
Code.
2 45
In contrast, the Court saw the debt characteristics of the Citizens
shares as substantial. The passbook accounts and certificates of deposit
were not subordinated to the claims of outside creditors; the deposits,
which could be withdrawn on thirty days notice, were not considered
permanent contributions to capital. 2" The Court also asserted that the
face amount of the passbook accounts and certificates of deposit was
$210,000, and that no one would pay more than that for the taxpayers'
shares. 247 That being true, the value attributable to the equity charac-
teristics of the shares was effectively zero, certainly far less than the
substantial amounts of equity required in Minnesota Tea and Nel-
son.24 In light of this analysis, the Court concluded that the Paulsens
had failed to meet the continuity of interest requirement; hence, the
transaction was not a tax-free reorganization under section
368(a)(1)(A) of the Internal Revenue Code.249
Justice O'Connor's dissent took an equally technical approach.
She agreed with the majority that the shares in Citizens Federal were
hybrid securities with debt and equity characteristics but argued that
the equity characteristics were substantial and that the shares thus sat-
isfied the continuity of interest test. 50 The Paulsens, in her view, had
become equitable owners of Citizens, retaining all the usual rights of
corporate stockholders. Thus, their interest carried more weight than
that obtained by the nonvoting preferred stockholders in the Nelson
case, in which the continuity of interest requirement had been
244 See id.
245 Id. at 632 (referencing the dividend exclusion set forth at I.R.C. § 116(b)(1)
(1982)); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.116-1(d)(2)(ii) (1984) (providing that "mutual sav-
ings banks . .. [and] loan associations" are ineligible for exclusion of their dividends).
248 Paulsen, 105 S. Ct. at 632.
See id.
248 See id.
249 See id. at 634. The taxpayers also cited Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332
(1967), in which mutual savings association shares "indistinguishable from Citizens'
shares" were held to be securities. Paulsen, 105 S. Ct. at 633-34. Justice Rehnquist
dismissed this argument, however, noting that the holding in Tcherepnin resulted from
a liberality in the interpretation of the securities laws "not warranted in construing the
scope of the reorganization provisions." Id. at 634.
50 See 105 S. Ct. at 635-36 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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satisfied.25'
Justice O'Connor took exception to the majority's overall method
of valuing the debt and equity characteristics of the shares separately,
pointing out that no court had ever taken this approach.2 52 In addition,
O'Connor disputed the majority's denigration of the value of the equity
characteristics of Citizens shares. She pointed out that dilution of voting
power may occur in a corporation at any time that there is a new issue
of stock253 and that proxy voting and preannounced fixed dividends are
similarly characteristic of corporate shareholding."' Finally, she sug-
gested that the market value of the right to participate on liquidation
and the deductibility of interest for tax purposes should be irrelevant to
the characterization of the Citizens shares for continuity of interest
purposes.
2 55
O'Connor concluded by pointing out that the majority opinion has
ramifications beyond mutual associations. This was the first case in
which the Court has had the opportunity to consider the use of hybrid
instruments in reorganizations. Previously, the Court had decided
whether continuity of interest was present simply on the basis of
whether the consideration received was stock. If the Court is now to
examine the actual exercise of the rights conferred by ownership of a
particular security, predictability will be sacrificed. The test, O'Connor
said, should be whether the instrument has the principal characteristics
of equity ownership; if so, it should be treated as equity for continuity
of interest purposes.256
The Paulsen decision reveals the shaky policy bases for the con-
251 See id. For a discussion of Nelson, see supra text accompanying notes 146-51.
252 See 105 S. Ct. at 636. Justice O'Connor noted that only Rev. Rul. 69-265,
1969-1 C.B. 109, supported the Court's fragmentation of an instrument into its debt
and equity components and that "[a]pparently no court has ever relied on such a dis-
tinction with respect to a single instrument." Id. The ruling concerned a Type C reor-
ganization, see infra text accompanying notes 287-94, in which stock that was given as
consideration was convertible into stock of another corporation. The ruling posited cer-
tain circumstances in which the convertibility feature would be considered as separate
"other" property, thereby invalidating the tax-free aspect of the reorganization.
25 See Paulsen, 105 S. Ct. at 637.
254 Id. O'Connor also noted that in the Nelson case, see supra notes 146-51 and
accompanying text, nonvoting preferred stock was found to confer continuity of interest.
255 See id. at 637. Justice O'Connor emphasized the specific historical context of
the provisions for deducting interest. See id. Her opinion also noted that the conclusion
reached by the majority is inconsistent with the tax-deferred treatment accorded merg-
ers between a stock association and a mutual association when the stock association is
the survivor. See Rev. Rul. 69-3, 1969-1 C.B. 103 (merger of two mutual associations);
Rev. Rul. 69-646, 1969-2 C.B. 54 (merger of mutual association into a stock associa-
tion). Revenue Ruling 69-3 was noted by the majority in Paulsen, but was distin-
guished as involving an exchange of like-kind securities. See 105 S. Ct. at 632.
258 See 105 S. Ct. at 638.
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tinuity of interest doctrine. No valid theoretical or policy reasons have
been given to justify the results reached in past continuity of interest
cases. Without a cohesive policy underlying the continuity of interest
doctrine, both the majority and dissenting opinions in Paulsen remain
inevitably mired at the level of technical analysis.
The approach taken by the Court in Paulsen is troubling. In or-
der to weigh the equity and debt components, the Court's analysis frag-
mented the mutual share involved.257 As Justice O'Connor noted, use
of this approach with respect to hybrid securities outside the mutual
associations area could undermine one of the few virtues of continuity
of interest doctrine: predictability of result.2 58 This fragmentation could
lead to a whole new generation of problems in the area of continuity of
interest. It may be hoped that the IRS, the lower courts, and the Su-
preme Court limit the Paulsen approach to the specialized problems of
mutual associations.25 9
2. Substance over Form
In addition to continuity of interest, the second great judicial doc-
trine to develop historically in the field of corporate reorganizations
was the doctrine of substance over form. In the seminal case of Gregory
v. Helvering,260 tax immortality was bestowed upon Mrs. Evelyn F.
Gregory when she effected a maneuver the consequences of which con-
tinue to pervade every area of tax law. Despite its influence throughout
tax law, the Gregory case holds perhaps its greatest sway in the reor-
ganization field.26'
Mrs. Gregory was the sole owner of the stock of United Mortgage
Company. Among its other assets, United Mortgage owned 1000 shares
of Monitor Securities Corporation. Mrs. Gregory wished to sell Moni-
tor Securities for cash and to retain all of her other holdings.2"2 The
most straightforward way of handling the transaction would have been
to cause United Mortgage to declare a dividend of the Monitor Securi-
157 See id. at 631-33.
258 See id. at 638 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
250 See supra note 229.
260 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
261 See, e.g., Rice's Toyota World, Inc. v. Commissioner, 752 F.2d 89, 95 (1985)
(citing Gregory in applying sham-transaction theory); Golden Nugget, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 83 T.C. 28, 38 (1984) (citing Gregory in characterizing a transaction as "a mere
device which put on the form of a corporate reorganization as a disguise for concealing
its real character"); Smith v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 705, 716 (1984) (Citing Gregory
in support of an analysis "in light of uncontroverted facts . . . not bound by the par-
ties' labels"); Superior Coach of Fla., Inc. v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 895, 905 (1983)
(citing Gregory in its application of step-transaction doctrine).
262 See Gregory, 293 U.S. at 467.
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ties stock and then to sell the stock for cash. However, the distribution
of the Monitor stock would have been taxable to Mrs. Gregory in full
as a dividend, and paying tax on a dividend was an inconvenience she
wished to avoid.263
One way to accomplish her goal was, of course, to liquidate
United Mortgage. This would have given Mrs. Gregory a step-up in
basis in her Monitor Securities stock to its fair market value at the
price of only a capital gain. The subsequent sale of Monitor Securities
would then have caused no further realization of gain, and Mrs. Greg-
ory would have accomplished her goal.
However, Mrs. Gregory did not wish to liquidate United Mort-
gage. While it does not appear from the record why she did not wish to
do so, some reasons may be easily inferred. From a tax standpoint, the
liquidation of United Mortgage would have triggered a capital gains
tax to Mrs. Gregory on Monitor Securities and on all the other assets
of United Mortgage distributed to her.2 ' This could have resulted in a
very substantial and, from Mrs. Gregory's point of view, very unneces-
sary tax liability. Moreover, there may well have been non-tax business
reasons why Mrs. Gregory did not want to liquidate United Mortgage.
Obviously the liquidation of a significant business, with its various con-
tracts and ongoing relations with customers and suppliers, is not some-
thing to be undertaken lightly.
Thus Mrs. Gregory and her tax advisers decided to pursue the
following scheme. They formed the Averill Corporation and caused
United Mortgage to transfer to Averill all the stock of Monitor Securi-
ties. In return, Averill issued all of its stock to Mrs. Gregory. Six days
later, Mrs. Gregory caused Averill to be liquidated. Under ihe reorgan-
ization statute in effect at that time-the predecessor of the spin-off
provisions of the current statute265-the liquidation was tax free to
Mrs. Gregory.266 Mrs. Gregory therefore took a low carryover basis on
the Monitor stock and enjoyed a capital gain on her immediate sale.
283 See id.
28 See I.R.C. § 331(a) (1982).
265 The current restrictive rules in this area developed largely as a response to
Mrs. Gregory's initial victory in the Tax Court. Gregory v. Commissioner, 27 B.T.A.
223 (1932). This decision was reversed by the Second Circuit, in an opinion by Judge
Learned Hand. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934), affd, 293 U.S. 465
(1935). The Gregory saga again illustrates the interplay that has been observed with
respect to the early development of the continuity of interest doctrine. Congress jumped
quickly to solve a perceived problem, which the courts ultimately also solved for cases
predating the legislation. The net result is redundancy and an increased complexity in
the relationship between the statute and case law. See H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess., 1939-1 C.B. (Part 2) 554, 563-65.
266 See Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 112(b)(3), 45 Stat. 791, 816 (1929) (cur-
rent version at I.R.C. § 354-355 (1982)).
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The Supreme Court concluded that the whole undertaking, though
admittedly conducted according to the terms of the statute, was
[s]imply an operation having no business or corporate pur-
pose-a mere device which put on the form of a corporate
reorganization as a disguise for concealing its real charac-
ter . . . . The whole undertaking . . . was an elaborate
and devious form of conveyance masquerading as a corporate
reorganization . . . . The rule which excludes from consid-
eration the motive of tax avoidance is not pertinent to the
situation, because the transaction upon its face lies outside
the plain intent of the statute. To hold otherwise would be to
exalt artifice above reality and to deprive the statutory provi-
sion in question of all serious purpose.26
The importance of the Gregory decision far transcends its particu-
lar facts. Gregory was the birthplace of the doctrine that a transaction
must have a business purpose to receive the benefits of the statute, and
that in the absence of a business purpose the several steps of a transac-
tion may be combined in order to reinterpret what actually happened.
The Gregory approach has also come to be known as the doctrine of
substance over form.26 Thus, under the aegis of Gregory, an elabo-
rately planned and carefully carried out reorganization, which meticu-
lously meets all the requirements of a complex statute, can still have its
steps consolidated and be declared taxable because it fails to evince a
business purpose.
The "step transaction" or "substance over form" doctrine now
comes in three forms, as discussed above in connection with the Mc-
Donald's case. 69 First, the courts may use the "end result" test. With
this test the court looks at the beginning and end of the transaction to
interpret what happened. Intermediate steps are ignored.27 0 The second
test is the "interdependence" test. The court examines the various steps
in a transaction to see if the taking of each step depends on the taking
of the others. If the steps are found to be interdependent, then the court
puts all the steps together to see what the tax consequences would be,
rather than analyzing the tax consequences of each step indepen-
287 Gregory, 293 U.S. at 469-70.
268 The doctrine of substance over form generally means that a transaction with
tax-avoidance motives may be recast to reflect its economic substance, thereby causing
the tax benefits to be lost. See B. BITTKER & J. BUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXA-
TION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 14.51, at 127-28 (4th ed. 1979).
289 See also Redding v. Commissioner, 630 F.2d 1169, 1175-78 (7th Cir. 1980).
270 Id. at 1175.
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dently.271 The final, and most restrictive form, is the "binding commit-
ment" test,272 in which the several steps of a transaction can be put
together only if the parties are contractually bound to move from one
step to the next.
273
The impact of Gregory has ranged far beyond the reorganization
and corporate tax provisions to become part of the common law of fed-
eral taxation that courts may use to undermine a taxpayer's elaborate
plans for tax avoidance. Gregory has been cited in over 1,000 federal
cases decided since 1935.274 As important as Gregory has become else-
where in the tax law, it remains a particularly brooding omnipresence
in the reorganization area, and no sound tax planning in this area can
take place without the Gregory doctrine receiving central
consideration.
2 75
From a policy standpoint, Gregory adds a substantial dash of irra-
tionality to an already irrational body of law. Even after all the bases
of the statute have been touched, and all the niceties of the continuity of
interest doctrine have been observed, it is still possible for a court to
look at the transaction and say that the whole edifice will be knocked
down on the grounds of substance over form or lack of business pur-
pose. The result could be that the transaction is taxed in a way that is
completely different from the expectations of the parties, notwithstand-
ing that they had followed the statute to the letter.
III. OVERVIEW OF CURRENT LAW
Having looked at the judicial and statutory evolution of the taxa-
tion of acquisitive reorganizations, it is useful now to summarize the
current law. The agonizing process of development of the law has led
to a system in which nonrecognition is accorded to acquisitive reorgani-
zations, if certain consideration is given and other rules are followed.
Concomitant with the nonrecognition provisions are substitute and car-
ryover basis rules that preserve the untaxed gain or loss on the trans-
271 Id. at 1177.
272 Id. at 1178.
273 See McDonald's Restaurants v. Commissioner, 688 F.2d 520, 524-25 (1982);
see also Mintz & Plumb, Step Transactions in Corporate Reorganizations, 12 N.Y.U.
INST. ON FED. TAX 247 (1954); Paul & Zimet, Step Transactions, in SELECTED
STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION 200 (2d ser. 1938).
274 This figure is based on a July 1985 search of the FTX-CS and FTX-CS
(OLD) databases on WESTLAW.
275 See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b), (c), T.D. 7745, 1981-1 C.B. 134, 140;
Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(g) (1960). These regulations in various ways reiterate the Greg-
oty theme of a need for a business purpose and warn that arrangements that are mere
devices to disguise a transaction's real character will not be treated as reorganizations.
1382 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
ferred assets.
The general outline of these provisions is as follows. To qualify
for nonrecognition of gain with respect to both the corporations and the
shareholders involved, the transaction must qualify as a reorganization,
and the steps of the transaction must have been taken in pursuance of a
plan of reorganization.2 7 Therefore, the definition of a reorganization
is critical. There are five major types of acquisitive reorganizations de-
fined in the statute.27 7 The definitions are keyed to the type of consider-
ation that must be given, the amount of assets that must be acquired,
and the formalities that must be followed. 27 8 Moreover, the judicially
imposed requirements relating to the continuity of interest and the re-
quirement of a business purpose must be met for all these types of
reorganizations, except where specifically modified by statute.
A. Definition of Acquisitive Reorganizations
1. The Type A Reorganization
The Type A reorganization is simply defined as "a statutory
merger or consolidation."27 To qualify for treatment under this provi-
sion, the transaction must be a merger or consolidation "effected pursu-
ant to the laws of the United States or a state or territory or the Dis-
trict of Columbia."28 0 Since the overwhelming number of corporations
are organized under the laws of the states, most Type A transactions
will be determined by reference to state law.
The statute imposes no requirements as to continuity of interest
with respect to a Type A reorganization, and consequently the judicial
and administrative rules discussed above will apply. Thus, at least fifty
percent of the consideration given in a Type A reorganization must be
equity to obtain a favorable advance ruling from the IRS.2 8 a Those few
taxpayers willing to hazard the transaction without the benefit of an
advance ruling should have at least thirty-eight percent equity as con-
27' See I.R.C. §§ 354, 368 (1982 & West Supp. 1985); see generally Manning,
In Pursuance of the Plan of Reorganization: The Scope of the Reorganization Provi-
sions of the Internal Revenue Code, 72 HARV. L. REV. 881, 884 (1959).
277 A sixth reorganization, the Type G reorganization, see I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(G)
(1982), involves a transfer by a corporation of all or part of its assets to another corpo-
ration in a title 11 (bankruptcy or reorganization) case. Since the shareholders in these
cases are generally wiped out, special rules regarding continuity of interest are provided
in these cases. An analysis of the Type G reorganization is beyond the scope of this
Article.
278 See I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(A)-(F) (1982).
279 I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(A) (1982).
20 Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(b)(1), T.D. 7422, 1976-2 C.B. 105, 107.
281 Rev. Proc. 77-37, 1977-2 C.B. 568, 569.
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sideration to stand a good chance in the courts.282 Additionally, there
must be continuity of the business enterprise.28
2. The Type B Reorganization
The Type B reorganization is-a transaction in which the acquiring
corporation obtains a controlling amount of the stock of the acquired
corporation.2 Under the statute, the consideration given by the acquir-
ing corporation must be solely the acquiring corporation's own voting
stock.285 Unlike the Type A reorganization, the Type B reorganization
permits the acquired corporation to remain in existence, as a controlled
subsidiary of the acquiring corporation. As with all these acquisitive
reorganizations, there must be continuity of the business enterprise. 288
The Type B reorganization can be used, for example, in a take-
over bid in which management of the acquired corporation is hostile to
the transaction. Since the deal is made on a stock-for-stock basis, the
acquiring corporation can make its appeal directly to the shareholders
of the acquired corporation.
3. The Type C Reorganization
The Type C reorganization involves an asset acquisition; as such,
it more closely resembles the Type A reorganization than the Type B.
Indeed, the Type C reorganization is known in the trade as a "practical
merger. "287 In a Type C reorganization the acquiring corporation must
obtain "substantially all" of the assets" of the acquired corporation in
exchange for the voting stock of the acquiring corporation.289 Since
"substantially all" of the assets of the acquired corporation must be
obtained, the degree to which assets may be stripped from the acquired
corporation before the reorganization (so-called "asset-tailoring") is
limited in a Type C reorganization, unlike in Type A or Type B
282 See supra note 165.
28 See supra note 168.
2" See I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(B) (1982).
285 This section of the Code provides that the voting stock of the parent of the
acquiring corporation may be used instead of the voting stock of the subsidiary corpora-
tion. See id.
26 See supra note 168.
28 See American Potash & Chem. Corp. v. United States, 399 F.2d 194, 201 (Ct.
Cl. 1968).
28 I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(C) (1982). For advance ruling purposes the Service has
indicated that "substantially all of the assets" means assets representing at least 90% of
the fair market value of the net assets (assets minus liabilities) and 70% of the fair
market value of the gross assets held by the corporation immediately before the trans-
fer. Rev. Proc. 77-37, 1977-2 C.B. 568, 569.
2 8 See I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(C) (1982).
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reorganizations.29
Unlike Type B, the Type C reorganization allows the acquiring
corporation to use property other than voting stock for up to twenty
percent of the consideration.291 Generally, this other property will be
cash, but it may be any other kind of tangible or intangible property or
other securities of the acquiring corporation. In addition, the assump-
tion of even substantial liabilities of the acquired corporation by the
acquiring corporation is permitted. 92 If the transaction involves prop-
erty other than voting stock (for example, cash), then any assumption
of liabilities is treated as other property and is counted along with it
against the twenty percent limit on property other than voting stock.29
Once the acquisition of assets has been completed, the acquired
corporation will still be in existence but will be essentially a holding
company for the acquiring company's voting stock and any other con-
sideration received. The acquired corporation must then be liquidated
in pursuance of the plan of reorganization. 2
190 Cf. Helvering v. Elkhorn Coal Co., 95 F.2d 732, 735 (4th Cir. 1937) (involv-
ing an attempt to transfer assets to two different companies under the predecessor to
section 368(a)(1)(C)), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 605 (1938).
291 See I.R.C. § 368(a)(2)(B) (1982).
1 See I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(C) (1982).
19 See I.R.C. § 368(a)(2)(B) (1982).
94 See I.R.C. § 368(a)(2)(G) (1982 & West Supp. 1985). The rule that the ac-
quired corporation must be liquidated in a Type C reorganization was added to the
statute by section 63(a) of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98
Stat. 494, 583. Under the Senate version of the bill, the liquidation had to take place
within 12 months of the acquisition, but the Conference Committee version provided
that the liquidation must be pursuant to the plan of reorganization, without specifying
a particular time period. H.R. REP. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 845-46 (1984).
Given this legislative history, it seems unlikely that the acquired corporation in a Type
C reorganization would be able to stay alive much longer than 12 months.
The likely reason for requiring the liquidation was that keeping the acquired cor-
poration alive presented tax avoidance possibilities. For example, the acquired corpora-
tion might be kept alive and its liquid assets used to engage at some future time in an
active trade or business. Or the acquired corporation could remain alive and make tax-
free distributions to shareholders under I.R.C. §§ 301(c)(1), 316(a) (1982), because the
reorganization would have caused its earnings and profits to have been transferred to
the acquiring corporation, pursuant to I.R.C. § 381(c)(2) (1982). See Rev. Rul. 73-
552, 1973-2 C.B. 116, 117; see also STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION,
GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE REvENUE PROVISIONS OF THE TAX REFORM Acr
OF 1984, H.R. Doc. No. 4170, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 189 (1984).
As is so often the case in trying to cure tax avoidance maneuvers, however, this
change opens up other planning possibilities. Keeping the acquired corporation alive in
a transaction that would otherwise qualify as a Type C reorganization now becomes a
way to kill the Type C reorganization treatment of the transaction by taxpayers who
want the transaction to be taxable (in order, for example, to step up the basis of the
assets in the hands of the acquiring corporation for depreciation purposes). The re-
quirement of a liquidation may be waived by the government. See I.R.C.
§ 368(a)(2)(G)(ii) (1982 & West Supp. 1985).
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4. The Forward Triangular Type A Reorganization
The resolution of the issue presented in Groman v. Commis-
sioner"' and Helvering v. Bashford298-whether an acquiring com-
pany's use of its parent's stock as consideration satisfies continuity of
interest requirements-gave rise to two forms of triangular mergers.
Governed by section 368(a)(2)(D) of the Internal Revenue Code, the
forward triangular merger is in effect a Type A reorganization, except
that the consideration paid for the assets acquired consists of stock of
the acquiring corporation's parent. No stock of the acquiring corpora-
tion itself may be used. Since the statute does not specify what portion
of the consideration must be stock of the parent, cash or other property
may be used along with that stock, subject to the general administrative
and judicial continuity of interest requirements."' The statute does re-
quire that the acquiring company obtain substantially all of the ac-
quired corporation's assets, thus limiting pre-reorganization asset
tailoring.298
5. The Reverse Triangular Type A Reorganization
Also a product of the Groman-Bashford litigation and its statutory
resolution is the reverse triangular merger. The pattern of the reverse
triangular merger, set forth at section 368(a)(2)(E) of the Internal Rev-
enue Code, is that the acquiring corporation merges into the acquired
corporation and thereby disappears. The parent of the acquiring/disap-
pearing corporation must come into control of the acquired corporation,
and the former shareholders of the acquired corporation must surrender
a controlling amount of their stock in exchange for voting stock of the
controlling parent.
When the transaction has been completed, the reverse triangular
reorganization closely resembles the Type B reorganization, in that the
acquired corporation remains alive, with its assets intact, under the
control of a new parent. That being the case, the rule on the considera-
tion that must be given to the shareholders of the acquired corporation
is similar to the rule for consideration in a Type B reorganization: that
at least eighty percent of the stock of the acquired corporation must be
surrendered by its shareholders for voting stock in the controlling cor-
poration. Thus, no more than twenty percent of the consideration may
295 302 U.S. 82 (1937), discussed supra notes 206-14 and accompanying text.
3 302 U.S. 454 (1938), discussed supra notes 209-14 and accompanying text.
29 The continuity of interest doctrine is discussed supra text accompanying notes
118-68.
29s See supra text accompanying note 288.
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be cash or other nonqualifying property.299 The acquired corporation
must continue to hold substantially all of its properties and substan-
tially all of the properties of the disappearing corporation."' 0 This pro-
vision limits the acquiring firm's use of pre-reorganization asset
tailoring.
B. Overlap Problems
An outstanding feature of this statutory scheme is the great
amount of overlap existing among these definitions. Ultimately, all of
the acquisitive reorganization patterns involve the acquisition of the as-
sets of one corporation by another, whether the assets are held directly
or indirectly through a subsidiary. It is apparent that a given transac-
tion may satisfy more than one of the reorganization definitions simul-
taneously. This situation is significant due to the fact that the substance
over form doctrine0 1 is always available to recharacterize transactions.
As discussed above, the requirements and the consequences of these
types of reorganizations vary widely. Therefore, characterizing which
type of transaction has occurred can be crucial to ascertaining whether
or not the requirements for nontaxability have been met and ascertain-
ing the ultimate consequences of the transaction.
To respond to this situation, Congress, the courts, and the IRS
have fashioned ordering rules that determine which reorganization will
be deemed to have occurred when the requirements of more than one
definition have been satisfied. The statute itself contains only one such
rule. Section 368(a)(2)(A) provides that when a transaction qualifies as
both Type C and Type D, it will be deemed to be Type D.302 Various
I" See I.R.C. § 368(a)(2)(E)(ii) (1982). The fact that some nonqualifying prop-
erty can be used as consideration in the reverse triangular reorganization can make it
an attractive alternative to the Type B reorganization, where only voting stock may be
used.
300 See I.R.C. § 368(a)(2)(E)(i) (1982).
301 See supra text accompanying notes 260-75.
302 A Type D reorganization involves
a transfer by a corporation of all or part of its assets to another corpora-
tion if immediately after the transfer the transferor corporation, or one or
more of its shareholders . . . or any combination thereof, is in control of
the corporation to which the assets are transferred; but only if, in pursu-
ance of the plan, stock or securities of the corporation to which the assets
are transferred are distributed in a transaction which qualifies under sec-
tion 354, 355, or 356.
I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(D) (1982). The Type D transaction, therefore, is not an acquisitive
reorganization but rather a shift or division of ownership of the underlying assets. As
indicated in the text, it may, however, overlap with a Type C reorganization in some
cases.
As an example of the significance of the ordering rule described in the text, if the
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other ordering rules have been promulgated from time to time by the
IRS and the courts."' While these ordering rules increase the complex-
ity of reorganization regulations, they are perhaps preferable to being
faced with an overlap problem for which there is not an established
treatment.
C. Treatment of Corporations
Once it is established that a transaction qualifies as a reorganiza-
tion under the definitional rules, it is then possible to ascertain the tax
consequences to the corporations involved in the reorganization. With
respect to merger reorganizations-the Type A and the forward and
reverse triangular Type A reorganizations-the acquired corporation is
never taxed on the transfer of its assets, regardless of the consideration
received. In the Type C reorganization, a corporation whose assets are
acquired will not be taxed unless it retains some assets to pay credi-
tors.30 With respect to stock acquisitions-Type B reorganiza-
assets transferred are subject to liabilities in excess of their basis, the tax consequences
will differ depending on whether the transaction is characterized as a Type C or Type
D reorganization. See I.R.C. § 357(c)(1)(B) (1982).
3os See, e.g., Commissioner v. Dana, 103 F.2d 359 (3d Cir. 1939) (overlap be-
tween Type B and Type C reorganizations); Rev. Rul. 67-448, 1967-2 C.B. 144 (over-
lap of Type B and reverse triangular reorganization), superseded by I.R.C.
§ 368(a)(2)(E) (1982); Rev. Rul. 57-276, 1957-1 C.B. 126 (overlap between Type A
and Type F reorganizations).
There are no ordering rules for transactions that may qualify as a Type A or a
Type C reorganization, or transactions that may qualify as a Type A or a Type D
reorganization.
304 Section 361(a) of the Internal Revenue Code provides that no gain or loss shall
be recognized to the transferor corporation if it transfers property pursuant to the reor-
ganization plan and receives solely stock or securities in return. Section 361(b) provides
that, if the transferor receives as consideration not only stock or securities received tax
free under subsection (a) but also other property or money, then that will trigger recog-
nition of gain to the transferor, unless the transferor distributes the other property or
money to its shareholders in pursuance of the plan of reorganization.
Clearly, all consideration is distributed to the shareholders in the Type A, the
forward triangular Type A, and the reverse triangular Type A reorganizations, since
the transferor corporation goes out of existence in those transactions.
In the Type C reorganization, the corporation whose assets are acquired will not
be taxed if it receives only stock or securities of the acquiring corporation in exchange
for its assets. I.R.C. § 361(a) (1982). If the acquired corporation receives other prop-
erty or money in addition to the stock or securities of the acquiring corporation, then
the acquired corporation will be taxed on the other property or money unless it distrib-
utes that other property or money in pursuance of the plan of reorganization. I.R.C.
§ 361(b)(1) (1982). To qualify as a Type C reorganization, however, the acquired
corporation must be liquidated in pursuance of the plan of reorganization under I.R.C.
§ 368(a)(2)(G) (1982 & West Supp. 1985). See supra notes 287-94 and accompanying
text. Therefore it would appear that the acquired corporation in a Type C reorganiza-
tion would never have to recognize gain. However, the acquired corporation in a Type
C reorganization might retain some of the cash it received from the acquiring corpora-
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tions-the question of recognition of gain by the acquired corporation
does not arise, since it does not undergo a realizing event but simply
has its stock ownership change hands.
The acquiring corporation is not taxed on the issuance of its
stock3°5 or bonds306 in any of these types of reorganizations. Of course
it is not taxed on the payment of money. However, it would have to
recognize gain on the use of appreciated property as part of the consid-
eration, since as to the appreciated property the exchange would be a
sale.$
07
D. Treatment of Shareholders
The shareholders whose tax treatment is in issue in an acquisitive
reorganization are, of course, the shareholders of the acquired corpora-
tion. The shareholders of the acquiring corporation are not involved.
Under all types of acquisitive reorganizations, the shareholders of the
acquired corporation are surrendering their stock in exchange for stock
of the acquiring corporation,308 money, and/or other property. If the
shareholders of the acquired corporation receive only stock, they do not
recognize any gain or loss."0 9 If, in addition to stock of the acquiring
corporation, property other than stock, including debt securities, is re-
tion to pay creditors and distribute the rest of its assets to its shareholders in liquida-
tion. In that event, it appears that the transaction would still qualify as a Type C
reorganization in that the payment to creditors would constitute a "distribution" for
purposes of I.R.C. § 368(a)(2)(G). See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 98TH
CONG., 2D SESS., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE REvENUE PROVISIONS OF THE
DEFICIT REDUCTION AcT OF 1984, at 190 (Comm. Print 1984). For purposes of
I.R.C. § 361(b), however, the acquired corporation would continue to recognize gain to
the extent that any money or other property is not distributed to its shareholders (as
opposed to its creditors) in pursuance of the plan of reorganization. Thus, as a plan-
ning matter, the acquired corporation would be well advised to transfer all of its liabili-
ties to the acquiring corporation and let the acquiring corporation use the cash to pay
the liabilities.
3o See I.R.C. § 1032 (1982 & West Supp. 1985). The nonrecognition rules of
section 1032, unlike the other nonrecognition provisions discussed in connection with
reorganizations, do not depend for their applicability on the existence of a reorganiza-
tion. It is always true that a corporation does not recognize gain or loss on the issuance
of its own stock. See also Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.1032-2, 46 Fed. Reg. 112 (1981)
(providing nonrecognition rules for the acquiring corporation in a triangular
reorganization).
'o The acquiring corporation is of course not taxed on the issuance of bonds in
connection with the reorganization, because the issuance of bonds, being a transaction
in the nature of a loan, is not a realizing event.
See International Freighting Corp. v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 310, 313 (2d
Cir. 1943).
... In a reorganization, shareholders may also be exchanging their stock for that
of the controlling parent.
309 See I.R.C. § 354(a)(1) (1982).
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ceived in exchange for stock of the acquired corporation, that will trig-
ger the recognition of the realized gain to the extent of the fair market
value of the other property received. 1 If debt securities are received in
exchange for debt securities surrendered, then no gain will be recog-
nized as long as the principal amount of the debt securities received is
equal to or less than the principal amount of the debt securities given
up." If debt securities are received in exchange for debt securities, and
the principal amount of the debt securities received is greater than the
principal amount of the debt securities given up, then gain will be rec-
ognized to the extent of the fair market value of the excess of the prin-
cipal amount of the debt securities received.
12
If gain is recognized to shareholders under these rules, the gain
will be treated as arising from the sale or exchange of the stock given
up (generally giving rise to a capital gain), unless the gain is found to
have the effect of a distribution of a dividend, in which case it will be
taxed as a dividend.31 3 Determining whether a gain has the effect of the
distribution of a dividend is ascertained under the redemption rules of
section 302, although it is not settled whether those redemption rules
are applied with reference to the acquired corporation or the acquiring
corporation. 14
In a Type A or Type C reorganization, the target corporation is
likely to have liabilities, which may be transferred to the acquiring cor-
poration. The tax treatment of the transfer of liabilities has proven
troublesome. The general rule is that the transfer of a liability incident
to a reorganization does not result in recognition of gain to the tar-
get.313 There are, however, exceptions. Gain is recognized if the tax-
payer had a tax avoidance purpose16 or generally if the aggregate lia-
bilities are in excess of the aggregate basis of the property
transferred. The transfer of liabilities is treated as money for basis
310 See I.R.C. §§ 354(a)(2)(A)(ii), (a)(3), 356(a)(1) (1982).
311 See I.R.C. § 354(a)(1)-(2) (1982).
312 See I.R.C. §§ 354(a)(2)(A)(i), 356(a) (1982); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.356-3,
T.D. 7616, 1979-1 C.B. 458 (illustrating the required calculation).
313 See I.R.C. § 356(a)(2) (1982).
314 Cf. Shimberg v. United States, 577 F.2d 283, 287-88 (5th Cir. 1978) (dividend
equivalence tested with reference to the acquired corporation); Wright v. United States,
482 F.2d 600, 607 (8th Cir. 1973) (dividend equivalence tested with reference to the
acquiring corporation); Rev. Rul. 75-83, 1975-1 C.B. 112, 113 (dividend equivalence
tested with reference to acquired corporation). The Shimberg approach tends to be less
favorable to taxpayers, because under Shimberg the cash received by shareholders of the
acquired corporation in proportion to their stockholdings in the acquired corporation
will be given dividend treatment.
315 I.R.C. § 357(a) (1982).
311 I.R.C. § 357(b) (1982).
327 I.R.C. § 357(c) (1982).
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purposes, causing the basis of property received in exchange to go
down, 8' as discussed in the following section.
E. Basis Rules
The stock received by the shareholders of the acquired corpora-
tions1" will take the basis of the stock transferred, decreased by the
amount of money and the fair market value of other property received
and increased by the amount of gain recognized to the shareholders. 2 0
The basis of the other property received is the fair market value of that
property.
3 21
The basis of property-whether assets or stock-received by the
acquiring corporation takes a basis equal to the basis the property had
in the hands of the transferor, increased by any gain recognized to the
transferor.
3 2 2
F. Carryover of Tax Attributes
In asset-acquisition reorganizations-Type A, Type C, and the
triangular reorganizations-the tax attributes of the acquired corpora-
tion, such as net operating losses, earnings, profits, and business credits,
carry over to the acquiring cprporation. 23 Special rules reduce the ex-
tent to which the acquiring corporation may make use of the acquired
corporation's net operating losses. 24
318 I.R.C. § 358(d) (1982).
319 The rules described in the text also apply to the acquired corporation itself, in
an asset acquisition, when it is in receipt of stock or other property in the reorganiza-
tion. Inasmuch as the acquired corporation in an asset acquisition will be disappearing
as part of the reorganization plan, the basis rules for the property it receives are not
generally of great consequence. See supra notes 287-94 and accompanying text.
320 I.R.C. § 358(a)(1) (1982).
321 See I.R.C. § 358(a)(2) (1982).
322 See I.R.C. § 362(a) (1982); see also Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.358-6, 46 Fed.
Reg. 112 (1981) (providing analogous rules for the basis of assets acquired in a trian-
gular reorganization).
323 See I.R.G. § 381(a)(2) (1982). This carryover of tax attributes also occurs
with Type D, Type F, and Type G reorganizations, which are beyond the scope of this
Article. The rule does not apply to the carryover of tax attributes in the Type B reor-
ganization, since in that instance the acquired corporation remains in existence.
324 See I.R.C. § 382 (1982); see also Eustice, The Tax Reform Act of 1976: Loss
Carryovers and Other Corporate Changes, 32 TAx L. REv. 113 (1977); Posin,
Changes in the Taxation of Corporations Effected by the Tax Reform Act of 1976:
Part II-Restrictions on Loss Carryovers, 4 J. CORP. TAx. 299 (1978). The effective
date of the new rules in this area, initially enacted in 1976, see Tax Reform Act of
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 806(e), 90 Stat. 1520, 1598-99, have been postponed
several times and recently were postponed again, until 1986, by section 62 of the Defi-
cit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494, 583.
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IV. SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE STAFF PROPOSALS FOR
REFORM
A. Overview
As the preceding discussion has indicated, the law in the area of
the taxation of corporate acquisitions has evolved into an exceedingly
complex set of rules. Therefore, it is not surprising that a number of
proposals for reform have been developed over the years by the tax bar,
the accounting profession, the Treasury Department, and congressional
committee staffs as part of a larger overhaul of the entire system of
corporate taxation. 25 A major focus of this work is the excessive com-
plexity of the present rules and the necessity for doing something about
it, in order to prevent a breakdown of the self-assessment system. Much
of the thinking that has been developed over the last decade or more in
this area has been embodied in the proposals of the staff of the Senate
Finance Committee, which issued its preliminary report on Septem-
ber 27, 1983,2' and its final report on May 20, 1985.327 Not surpris-
ingly, a major touchstone of these proposals is simplifying the rules for
taxing corporations.32
With respect to the taxation of acquisitive corporate reorganiza-
tions, the Final Report proposes a two-step process.3 9
325 See, e.g., AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT: SUBa-
CHAPTER C (1980); FEDERAL TAX DIVISION OF THE AMERICAN INSTrrUTE OF CER-
TIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, TAXATION OF THE FORMATION AND COMBINATION
OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISES (1979); ABA Committee on Corporate Stockholder Rela-
tions, Tax Section Recommendation No. 1981-5, 34 TAX LAW. 1386 (1981); Beghe,
The American Law Institute Subchapter C Study: Acquisitions and Distributions, 33
TAX LAW. 743 (1980); Committee on Tax Policy (1970-1971), Tax Section of the
New York State Bar Association, A Report on Complexity and the Income Tax, 27
TAX L. REV. 325 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Tax Policy Report]; Jacobs, Reorganiz-
ing the Reorganization Provisions, 35 TAX L. REv. 415 (1980).
326 Some of the analysis in this report has been discussed earlier in this Article.
See supra notes 182-99 and accompanying text. See generally Faber, Taxation of Cor-
porations and Shareholders: Premises of the Present System, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 5
(1985); Ginsburg, Special Topics in the Acquisitions Area, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 159
(1985); LeDuc, Current Proposals to Restructure the Taxation of Corporate Acquisi-
tions and Dispositions: Substance and Process, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 17 (1985);
Thompson, A Comparison of the Merger and Acquisition Provisions of Present Law
with the Provisions in the Senate Finance Committee's Draft Bill, 22 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 171 (1985).
327 STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 99TH CONG., 1ST SEss., FINAL RE-
PORT ON THE SUBCHAPTER C REVISION ACT OF 1985, (Comm. Print 1985) [herein-
after cited as FINAL REPORT].
328 See id. at 38.
329 The discussion of these proposals is based on the Final Report. See id. at 50-
58 (summary of proposals); id. at 211-35, 237-39 (technical explanation); id. at 79-132
(proposed statutory language); see also PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 182, at 55-
64 (summary of proposals).
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1. Qualified Acquisition
As a first step, the transaction must meet the requirements for
treatment as a "qualified acquisition." A "qualified acquisition" is ei-
ther a "qualified stock acquisition" or a "qualified asset acquisition" as
defined by a proposed new section 364 of the Internal Revenue
Code.330
A qualified stock acquisition is defined as any transaction or series
of transactions during a twelve-month acquisition period 3 , in which
one corporation acquires stock representing control of another corpora-
tion.33 2 This transaction approximates a Type B reorganization, with
the addition of the twelve-month time limitation.33
A qualified asset acquisition means (1) any statutory merger or
consolidation, or (2) any other transaction in which one corporation
acquires at least seventy percent of the gross fair market value and at
least ninety percent of the net fair market value of the assets of another
corporation, and the transferor corporation distributes, within twelve
months of the acquisition date, all of its remaining assets (other than
assets retained to meet claims) to its shareholders or creditors.4"' These
transactions approximate Type A and Type C reorganizations under
present law.335
Certain tax consequences flow from a finding that a qualified ac-
quisition has occurred. The proposals introduce explicit electivity into
the system by treating all qualified acquisitions as "carryover basis ac-
quisitions," unless an election for treatment as a "cost basis acquisi-
tion" is made."3e
a. Carryover Basis Acquisitions
The immediate income consequence of a carryover basis acquisi-
tion is that no gain or loss is recognized by the target corporation.
337
The particular consequences for the basis of the acquiring corporation
in the target corporation depend on whether the transaction is treated
as a qualified asset acquisition or a qualified stock acquisition.
330 See FINAL REPORT, supra note 327, at 112.
331 This period is defined as the "12 month period beginning with the date of the
first acquisition of stock . . . involved in the qualified stock acquisition." Id. at 127.
332 Id. at 112-13.
33 For a description of the Type B reorganization, see supra text accompanying
notes 284-86.
3" FINAL REPORT, supra note 327, at 113.
3:' See supra notes 279-83 & 287-94 and accompanying text.
ss See FINAL REPORT, supra note 327, at 117.
837 See id. at 106.
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i. Qualified Asset Acquisitions
If the transaction is a qualified asset acquisition, the acquiring
corporation takes the same basis in the assets acquired as the assets had
in the hands of the target corporation." 8" The same rule applies to asset
acquisitions-Type A and Type C reorganizations-under present
law.3
3 9
ii. Qualified Stock Acquisitions
If the transaction is a qualified stock acquisition, the proposed
rules provide an approach different from that used for stock acquisi-
tions (Type B reorganizations) under present law. The current rule
requires that the acquiring corporation take a basis of the target subsid-
iary's stock that is the same as the basis in the hands of the target's
former shareholders. 40 Under proposed new section 1020 of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code, the basis of the target's stock in the hands of the
acquiring corporation is tied to the basis of the assets of the target in
the target's hands.341 The purpose of this approach is to eliminate
"many of the discontinuities under current law" between transactions
involving assets and those involving stock of an acquired subsidiary. 
42
Section 1020 implements this approach with a technical provision
requiring that the "net inside basis"-the asset basis reduced by the
issue price of any outstanding liabilities of the target assumed by the
acquiror- 3 '3 be increased in the amount by which the cost of the stock
received exceeds the net inside basis (or decreased by the amount the
cost of the stock is less than the net inside basis).344 This "premium" or
"discount" correction will cease to be made three years after the acqui-
sition. 45 During the initial three-year period, however, the provision in
effect uses a cost basis for the stock, instead of a carryover basis, despite
the fact that the transaction is a carryover basis acquisition. s4'
338 Id. at 110.
339 See supra note 322 and accompanying text.
340 See FINAL REPORT, supra note 327, at 31.
31 See id. at 162.
S42 Id. at 54.
343 Id. at 162.
4" See id. at 162-64.
45 See id. at 165.
-'6 Although not explicitly stated by the Final Report, the reason for this pro-
posed rule may be the now-familiar problem identified in Kimbell-Diamond Milling
Co. v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 74, affld per curiam, 187 F.2d 718 (5th Cir. 1950),
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 827 (1951). The Kimbell-Diamond problem has proven to be
surprisingly difficult to deal with statutorily, and its history is perhaps instructive in
this era of "tax reform" and "simplification."
Kimbell-Diamond involved a corporation that bought control of a company owning
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b. Cost Basis Acquisitions
If a cost basis acquisition is elected, the treatment of the transac-
tion will depend on whether it is a qualified asset acquisition or a qual-
ified stock acquisition.
If the transaction is a qualified asset acquisition, the target corpo-
ration recognizes gain or loss, and the acquiring corporation obtains a
cost (usually "stepped-up") basis in the assets acquired, 4 " determined
under present I.R.C. § 1012.348
If the transaction is a qualified stock acquisition, the target corpo-
ration will recognize gain or loss on its assets-notwithstanding that
the target remains in existence and its assets have not been transferred
to the acquiring corporation. 4 9 The basis of the target company stock
in the hands of the acquiring corporation is the cost of that stock to the
acquiring corporation.3 50
assets whose basis was much higher than their fair market value. The acquiring corpo-
ration then liquidated the target company and took a carryover basis in the target's
assets, under section 113(a)(15) of the 1939 Code, predecessor to the present I.R.C.
§ 334(b)(1) (1982). Thus, the parent in effect had purchased high-basis assets for a
low price, and it could then use that high basis for depreciation or for a deductible loss
on a subsequent sale. The court in Kimbell-Diamond held on substance-over-form
grounds that this maneuver was not effective. See 14 T.C. at 80 (noting that the min-
utes of the acquiring corporation evidenced a clear intent to liquidate the target com-
pany immediately after acquisition). Thus, the acquiring corporation was required to
take the cost of the stock that it surrendered on the liquidation as its basis for the assets
acquired.
Congress, however, was not content to let the issue be resolved by a judicial deter-
mination of intent. In 1954 it enacted a provision--codified as I.R.C.
§ 334(b)(2)-that set forth objective criteria for evaluating various forms of the Kim-
bell-Diamond maneuver. See Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 591, § 334,
68A Stat. 1, 104-06.
Section 334(b)(2) proved inadequate to deal with the various tax planning maneu-
vers that developed around it, however. Congress therefore repealed it and enacted in
its place a provision codified at I.R.C. § 338 (1982 & West Supp. 1985). See Internal
Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 338, 96 Stat. 324, 485-90 (1982). Sec-
tion 338, however, has proven to be an extremely complex provision. See, e.g., Ward,
The TEFRA Amendments to Subchapter C: Corporate Distributions and Acquisitions,
8 J. CORP. L. 277, 308-35 (1983).
If the new proposed section 1020 is enacted, section 338 would make an unusually
rapid exit out the revolving door of tax reform. Given its complexity, however, this exit
may be well deserved. In retrospect, Congress might have been better off to leave the
Kimbell-Diamond problem in the hands of the courts, which had, some thirty-five years
ago, developed a reasonably effective answer to the problem.
M FINAL REPORT, supra note 327, at 106-08.
-48 See id. at 223. Although, in general, acquiring corporations elect to apply a
cost basis, elections of a carryover basis may be made with respect to goodwill and
certain other intangibles. See id. at 51.
49 See id. at 106-07.
330 See I.R.C. § 1012 (1982). For a general discussion of the valuation of the
stock given up in this type of transaction, see Porter, The Cost Basis of Property Ac-
quired by Issuing Stock, 27 TAx LAW. 279 (1974).
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2. Shareholder Treatment
Once it has been determined that there has been a qualified acqui-
sition, the treatment of shareholders is determined independently of the
treatment of the corporations and of the election made at the corporate
level. Rather, under the proposed amendments to I.R.C. § 354, share-
holders of the acquired corporation would be entitled to nonrecognition
if they receive stock or securities of the acquiring corporation. 51 Debt
securities may be received tax free, however, only to the extent that the
issue price of the debt securities received does not exceed the basis of
the debt securities surrendered. 52
Receipt of "nonqualifying consideration"-that is, any considera-
tion that cannot be received tax free-results in recognition of gain to
the stockholder or security holder.3 53 The character of gain recognized
under amended I.R.C. § 356 would be determined by the section 302
redemption rules, making reference to the acquiring corporation. 3"
B. Criticism
1. Complexity
The relatively brief discussion above does not begin to describe the
variety of complex technical rules that is part of the new legislation
proposed by the Final Report. Indeed, there are 130 pages (double
spaced) of new statutory language proposed by the Final Report as an
overhaul of subchapter C.3 55 The staff of the Senate Finance Commit-
tee and their advisers may be commended for the high level of technical
competence evident in this material. But it may be questioned whether
the broader goals of the staff's efforts have been achieved in their spe-
cific proposals for reform.
One of the major reasons for proposing change in this area was to
351 See FINAL REPORT, supra note 327, at 83. This consideration could include
stock or securities of an affiliate of the acquiring corporation, see id. at 52, thereby
loosening the shackles of the codified Groman-Bashford doctrine. See supra text ac-
companying notes 206-14.
35' These proposals are roughly comparable to the present law, see supra notes
311-12 and accompanying text, except that the proposals, by focusing on the basis of
the debt securities surrendered, contemplate the use of the time value of money to as-
certain the amount of taxable boot on the receipt of debt securities. See FINAL REPORT,
supra note 327, at 44.
SS See FINAL REPORT, supra note 327, at 94.
3" See id. at 9,7. Thus, the approach of Wright v. United States, 482 F.2d 600,
607-08 (8th Cir. 1973), see supra note 314, would be followed, and the approach of
Shimberg v. United States, 577 F.2d 283, 287-88 (5th Cir. 1978), supra note 314,
would be rejected in this area. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 327, at 217.
355 FINAL REPORT, supra note 327, at 79-208.
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reduce complexity. 5 ' With 130 pages of new statutory material, the
proposals represent something less than a ringing success in this
effort.1
17
One goal of these reforms was to change the taxation of corporate
acquisitions from a system of transactional electivity-in which taxpay-
ers manipulate the type of consideration received, the formation of sub-
sidiaries, and other elements of the transaction"' in order to achieve
desired tax results-to a system of explicit electivity, in which taxpay-
ers could simply check off a form and elect the particular tax treatment
they desire. 5 9 At first it appears that this goal has been achieved: once
there has been a qualified acquisition, the parties may elect a cost basis
acquisition or a carryover basis acquisition.360 However, taxpayers have
to jump through some pretty strict transactional hoops in order to
achieve a qualified acquisition. 61 They may choose to jump through
those hoops or not, depending on whether they wish to get into the
elective system or avoid it. Thus transactional electivity is still present
in the system.
The entire elective system can also be upended by taxpayer trans-
actions subsequent to an election. For example, suppose the parties en-
gage in a transaction in which the acquiring corporation acquires over
seventy percent of the gross fair market value and over ninety percent
of the net fair market value of the assets of the target. This transaction
would constitute a qualified acquisition. 36 2 The parties do not elect a
cost basis acquisition, and the transaction will therefore be treated as a
carryover basis acquisition. 63 Suppose, however, that the target corpo-
ration does not distribute all of its assets within the required twelve-
356 See id. at 38.
'"As just one example, consider the new I.R.C. § 1020, see supra text accompa-
nying note 341, which determines the basis of a target's stock in the hands of an ac-
quiring corporation in a qualified stock acquisition. Under this provision, when a cor-
poration makes a qualified stock acquisition instead of a cost basis acquisition, the
transaction will be treated as a carryover basis acquisition. As discussed above, the
general theory of section 1020 keys the basis of the stock to the basis of the assets plus
any premium or discount at the time of the acquisition to create a "carryover" basis.
The new section includes technical rules for computing the acquiring corporation's ba-
sis where it has not purchased 100% of the target's stock. See FINAL REPORT, supra
note 327, at 162-63. In addition, it includes a variety of technical rules for keeping
track of premiums or discounts during sales by the target of some of its assets. See, e.g.,
id. at 163-65.
s See supra notes 279-300 and accompanying text.
8 See FINAL REPORT, supra note 327, at 41.
3 0 See supra text accompanying note 336.
861 See supra text accompanying notes 330-35.
36 See supra text accompanying note 334.
363 See supra text accompanying note 336.
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month period following the acquisition. 8" The transaction will then
belatedly be deemed unqualified, and twelve months after the fact it
will have to be restructured as taxable, with a cost basis to the acquir-
ing corporation.
Thus, the parties can wait for twelve months after the acquisition
and see if they wish to fall out of tax-free carryover basis treatment,
depending on their particular tax circumstances at that time. Admit-
tedly, this maneuver can occur under present law, but the new propos-
als are supposed to be an improvement.
Moreover, there is an air of unreality about the provision for an
explicit election of cost basis treatment. Taxable cost basis treatment is
always available under the new rules if the parties simply fail to have a
qualified asset acquisition. As pointed out above, one may intentionally
fail to meet those requirements. Thus, parties who are clear that they
want a cost basis, taxable transaction-for example, for purposes of
stepping up the basis of the acquired assets for depreciation-may be
best advised, depending on the tax consequences to the shareholder,
simply to structure their transaction so that it fails to become a quali-
fied acquisition, rather than to create a qualified acquisition and run
the risk that the election for cost basis treatment will be filed improp-
erly, causing them to be stuck with carryover basis treatment. Thus,
few transactions would ever actually run the pattern of a qualified asset
acquisition followed by a cost basis election.
It appears, therefore, that these proposals have not achieved their
stated goals of creating a simple system that is explicitly elective.
2. An Election in Tax Polarity
Consider further the principle of an election. As pointed out
above,3" 5 if the two corporations are interested in a taxable, cost basis
transaction, they will probably simply avoid having a qualifying acqui-
sition. Thus, transactional electivity will continue to play a major role
under these proposals.
But suppose the proposed rules were modified so that explicit elec-
tion did dominate the field. For example, suppose a qualified acquisi-
tion would occur if the acquiring corporation obtained fifty-one percent
of the stock or assets of the target within a five-year period. It would
now be much more difficult to structure a corporate acquisition that
would not be deemed a qualified acquisition. Most corporate acquisi-
tions would therefore be drawn into the explicit elective system of the
3" See supra text accompanying note 333.
363 See supra text accompanying notes 361-64.
1985] 1397
1398 UNIVERSIT 2 OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
new rules.
This situation may not proceed, however, quite as smoothly as the
proposed rules seem to contemplate.3 6 The acquiring corporation and
target company will generally disagree on whether they want a tax-
free, carryover basis transaction or a taxable, cost basis transaction. 6 '
They are, in the vernacular of the field, in tax polarity.
Under current law, there are also two fundamental options: at the
corporate level the transaction may be taxable, or it may be a tax-free
reorganization. If, for example, the deal is an acquisition of the assets
of the target company in exchange for mostly cash and notes, it will be
taxable. The target will have to pay taxes on the appreciation in value
of its assets sold, and the assets in the hands of the acquiring corpora-
tion will have a stepped-up fair market value basis. If, instead, the par-
ties choose to use a sufficient amount of stock in the transaction, it can
be a nontaxable reorganization, with no tax to the target on the sale,
and carryover basis for the assets in the hands of the acquiring
corporation.368
Thus, the new rules do not increase the presently existing tax po-
larity between the acquiring corporation and the target. Indeed, the
new rules decrease the adversary relationship between the parties some-
what, in that the parties can now use the consideration they want and
still elect their preferred tax result at the corporate level.
Such a liberalization of corporate tax rules may not be desirable in
this era of federal budget deficits and decline in the share of tax reve-
nues paid by corporations."6" Whatever the defects of the continuity of
interest doctrine, it at least required the parties to use a substantial
amount of equity to achieve nonrecognition treatment. Use of a sub-
860 See FINAL REPORT, supra note 327, at 221-28.
8 In the most usual case-the acquisition of a target with appreciated as-
sets-the acquiring corporation would want a taxable, cost-basis transaction, to step up
the basis of the assets for depreciation purposes. The target corporation would want a
tax-free, carryover basis transaction to eliminate tax to itself.
868 See supra text accompanying notes 279-300. If cash and notes are used, the
target corporation can still avoid tax if it is prepared to liquidate under I.R.O. § 337
(1982). A similar analysis can be made for stock acquisitions. Under current law the
parties may choose to include cash or notes in the deal and thus render the transaction
taxable. In that event, the stock sale will be taxable to the shareholders, and the stock
will have a cost basis in the hands of the acquiring corporation. In the alternative, the
parties may choose to use only voting stock as consideration, in which case the transac-
tion would not be taxable to the selling shareholders, and the stock would take a carry-
over basis in the hands of the acquiring corporation. See supra text accompanying notes
284-86.
"69 See A. AUiERBACH, CORPORATE TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (1982)
(Brookings Institution papers on economic activity) (detailing the drop in corporate tax
collections from 28% of total revenues in the mid-1950's to about eight percent
currently).
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stantial amount of equity may not always be convenient for the parties:
the owners of the acquiring corporation may not wish to dilute their
control by issuing additional stock, and the shareholders of the target
may hesitate to take stock if it is not readily tradable. Removal of this
inconvenience may significantly increase the number of corporate trans-
actions eligible for nonrecognition treatment.
Under the Finance Committee staff proposals, the acquiring cor-
poration will generally make the election. In the case of a qualified
asset acquisition other than a statutory merger or consolidation, theelection must also be made by the target corporation.'" Although in
many cases the election need only be filed by the acquiring corporation,
as a practical matter both parties-including the shareholders of the
target-would have to agree on such an important matter in order to
consummate the deal.
37 1
Under these circumstances this election will probably not be as
easily chosen or innocuous a procedure as other elections of the Internal
Revenue Code-such as the election to operate a corporation under
subchapter S,3 7 2 the election out of the installment method for reporting
a deferred payment sale,373 and the election to exclude gain from the
sale of a principal residence by a taxpayer who has reached age fifty-
five. ' 74 Generally, the taxpayers involved in elections such as these will
be in agreement as to whether the election should be made. In contrast,
the election to make an acquisitive corporate reorganization taxable or
not is an election that must be filed by two taxpayers whose interests on
the matter are adverse.
370 See FINAL REPORT, supra note 327, at 228.
371 The Securities and Exchange Commission generally requires disclosure of rel-
evant tax information to shareholders of corporations involved in mergers or acquisi-
tions. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act Rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1985)
(forbidding false or misleading statements in proxy statements); Securities Exchange
Act Schedule 14A, Item 14, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 item 14 (1985) (requiring cer-
tain information in proxy statements); Securities Exchange Act Schedule 14D-1, Item
10(f), 17 C.F.R. § 240-14d-100 item 10(f) (1985) (governing statements in connection
with tender offers). For examples of the type of tax information typically disclosed in
corporate acquisitions, see General Motors Corporation Proxy Statement, Sept. 21,
1984, at 40-44 (issued in connection with GMC's acquisition of Electronic Data Sys-
tems); Robin Acquisition Corp. Offer to Purchase for Cash Common Stock of Uniroyal
Inc., Apr. 15, 1985, at 7-8.
372 See I.R.C. § 1362 (1982 & West Supp. 1985); see also B. BrrrxFR & J.
EUSTICE, supra note 268, at 6.02 (discussing requirements corporations must satisfy
to make an election under subchapter S).
'73 See I.R.C. § 453(d) (1982); see also D. POSIN, supra note 17, at 392-95 (us-
ing detailed examples to describe the installment method of reporting).
3- See I.R.C. § 121 (1982); see also D. POSIN, supra note 17, at 167-68 (discuss-
ing the permanent exclusion of gain from a sale of residence by a person fifty-five years
or older).
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Beyond these problems, the proposals contemplate that the elec-
tion, if filed at all, could be filed up to nine months after the acquisi-
tion. 7 5 The parties might complicate matters further by filing inconsis-
tent reports. One party could claim that a valid election had been made,
while the other claimed the opposite, resulting in a conflict that might
be resolvable only through litigation.
The situation also conjures up the possibility of a bizarre three-
cornered litigation in which the acquiring corporation and the acquired
corporation's former shareholders disagree on whether a valid election
has been filed, and the Service takes sides with one or the other, de-
pending on which outcome will yield the most revenue. Indeed, the Ser-
vice might litigate against both sides, in different jurisdictions, and per-
haps obtain inconsistent results. 76 This does not advance the cause of
simplification.
As pointed out above, the proposed rules do not seem to create a
system that would be explicitly elective in practice. 77 The foregoing
analysis has suggested that even if the proposed rules were modified to
create an explicitly elective system, such a system would not work as
smoothly as other elections in the Internal Revenue Code.
3. Selective Asset Sales
Another problem with the proposed rules is that the ability of cor-
porations involved in an acquisition to elect basis treatment could lead
to manipulations of the rules. For example, corporations may engage in
the selective advance purchase of appreciated assets to gain a basis step-
up in those particular assets, followed by an acquisition in which they
elect no taxability and carryover basis for the balance of the assets. In
an attempt to foreclose these maneuvers, the Final Report sets forth
further rules regarding the election of cost or carryover basis. The rules
5 See FINAL REPORT, supra note 327, at 232.
376 It is ironic that one of the reasons given in support of the proposals in the
Final Report is the elimination of inconsistent results-whipsaw-in the present law.
Cf King Enters. v. United States, 418 F.2d 511, 516 (Ct. Cl. 1969) (discussing differ-
ences in application of step transaction principles).
A lesson can be learned here from the whipsaw problem that arises on the sale of
a sole proprietorship, where the parties must allocate the sale price among the various
assets of the business for purposes of characterizing the gain or loss on each asset as
capital or ordinary income. The parties are generally adverse on this matter, particu-
larly on the question of allocating a portion of the sales price to good will or to a
covenant not to compete. This tax polarity has led to substantial litigation after the fact,
including cases of whipsaw. See D. POSIN, supra note 17, at 261-62; Remarks by
Philip R. Miller at Court of Claims Judicial Conference, October 14, 1971, on
Whipsaw Problems in Tax Cases, 25 TAx LAw. 193, 193 (1972).
$7 See supra text following note 364.
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specify a two-year "consistency period," extending from one year before
to one year after the acquisition date. Any asset separately acquired by
the acquiring corporation during the consistency period must be treated
consistently with the qualified acquisition (both carryover or both cost
basis acquisitions). Failure to treat such transactions consistently results
in mandatory cost basis treatment for the asset separately acquired and
for the qualified acquisition." 8
This rule might be circumvented if the target corporation drops
the appreciated asset into a controlled subsidiary. When the acquiring
corporation acquires the target, it may accomplish a selective step-up in
asset basis by electing a carryover basis as to the target and a cost basis
as to the subsidiary.379 The Final Report has sought to foreclose this
maneuver by providing that the consistency period would apply not
only to assets acquired directly from the target corporation but also to
assets of the target obtained in a qualified asset or stock acquisition of
an affiliate corporation of the target.380 Overall, the Final Report pro-
vides fifteen examples of how the consistency rules would operate to
prevent avoidance maneuvers. 81
It appears, however, that there are several problems with the rules
establishing a consistency period. First, they are not strikingly simple,
despite the fact that simplicity is supposed to be a major justification for
these proposals. Second, they involve administrative difficulty in tracing
what will, in some cases, be a great number of asset transfers during
the consistency period. Third, they can be avoided by effecting transfers
outside the two-year period, a potentially worthwhile endeavor for as-
sets with a substantial unrealized gain or loss. Thus selective basis step-
up is still possible. Fourth, the rules require additional clarification.
For example, suppose an asset has moved from the target to an affiliate
of the target during the consistency period and is then disposed of by
the affiliate in a nonrecognition transaction.38 2 The taint of being a
"hot" asset in this regard will have to be transferred to the asset re-
ceived in the exchange, requiring additional technical rules. These rules
could become quite complex if several assets and boot are involved in
the exchange.
Finally, these rules have the problem that in many cases the tail
can wag the dog in a most cumbersome fashion. Relatively small asset
17 See, e.g., FINAL REPORT, supra note 327, at 228.
"' This pattern is possible under the proposed rules, which contemplate that elec-
tions will be made on a corporation-by-corporation basis. See id. at 228-33.
3'0 See id. at 230 (example viii).
381 Id. at 229-30.
31 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1031 (1982 & West Supp. 1985) (governing like-kind
exchanges).
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sales by the target to the acquiring corporation during the consistency
period can trigger a large qualified acquisition to be treated as a cost
basis acquisition instead of a carryover basis acquisition, contrary to the
expectations of the parties.3 8 There are some nightmarish problems
here for the ill advised. 8 '
4. Entity Versus Aggregate
Another unsettling aspect of these basis election proposals is that
they start to look like the rules for the taxation of partnerships. 38 5 One
of the causes of the extreme complexity of partnership taxation is the
conflict in subchapter K of the Internal Revenue Code between treating
the partnership as an entity and penetrating the partnership form to
treat it as an aggregate of assets. Some leading commentators have sug-
gested that
[t]his blending of aggregate and entity concepts is one of the
primary sources of uncertainty in the interpretation and ap-
plication of Subchapter K. A wide variety of situations that
are not squarely covered by the statute are susceptible to res-
olution in dramatically different ways, depending on whether
effect is given to the entity or aggregate concept. The absence
of a unifying entity or aggregate theme in the statute means
that these situations must be resolved on an ad hoc basis, by
reference to the way in which the statute applies the entity
and aggregate concepts to related or analogous situations-a
process which is difficult, tedious and uncertain. The resul-
tant lack of predictability in the application of Subchapter K
is exacerbated [sic] because the considerations which lead to
the predominance of the entity or aggregate concept in one
context may be only subtly different from those which give
rise to the use of the opposing concept in another."88
While the limited basis elections involved in the Final Report do
not begin to approach in complexity the various basis adjustments in
the partnership area, these proposals are probably a step in the wrong
direction. In the future, there may be additional basis adjustments or
s See FINAL REPORT, supra note 327, at 229-30.
Regulations might provide some relief in this area. See id. at 229. However,
regulations interpreting these already complex rules would put further demands on
practitioners.
"5 See I.R.C. §§ 732(d), 734, 743, 754 (1982 & West Supp. 1985).
$86 W. McKEE, W. NELSON & R. WHITMIRE, FEDERAL TAXATION OF PART-
NERSHIPS AND PARTNERS 1-7 (1977).
[Vol. 133:1335
TAXING CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS
other proposals that may treat the corporation as an aggregate of assets
rather than as an entity, further complicating the field of corporate tax-
ation. Indeed, the current proposals already employ partnership lexicon
in referring to "inside basis" and "outside basis" with respect to an
asset owned by a corporation or the stock owned by its shareholders.
887
5. Continuity of Interest
One would have hoped that such comprehensive proposals as these
would have at least eliminated the continuity of interest doctrine as a
touchstone for taxability."88 Unfortunately, some of the more irrational
vestiges of this venerable doctrine still linger in the proposed rules for
the taxation of shareholders. As pointed out above, the treatment of
shareholders under the proposals would be ascertained independently of
whether there was recognition of gain at the corporate level.38 9 Those
shareholders who receive stock in exchange for their stock in the ac-
quired corporation would be accorded nonrecognition of gain.390
This is not a particularly satisfactory result. For example, a share-
holder whose small auto parts firm is taken over by General Motors in
a transaction that would fit within a Type C reorganization under pre-
sent law would under the proposals not be taxed on the receipt of Gen-
eral Motors stock, notwithstanding that she has a relatively liquid in-
vestment that has only an infinitesimal relation to her old business.
There seems to be no reason to defer gain to this shareholder, who can
easily sell some of the stock to pay the tax. The difference between the
shareholder who receives General Motors stock and the shareholder
who receives cash is inconsequential. By contrast, a shareholder who
sells her small auto parts business to another small firm and receives, in
exchange for her stock, debt of the new small firm, secured by her for-
mer assets, has taxable gain both under current law and these propos-
als. Thus, one of the more irrational aspects of the continuity of interest
doctrine is carried forward in the Senate Finance Committee staff's
proposals for reform. 91
If one were writing on a clean slate, it would seem preferable, and
more in accord with the policy and the early historical development of
"' This terminology is used in connection with new proposed section 1020. See
FINAL REPORT, supra note 327, at 237. For use of this terminology with respect to the
extremely complex basis calculations in the partnership area, see, for example, S. LIND,
S. SCHWARZ, D. LATHROPE & J. ROSENBERG, FUNDAMENTALS OF PARTNERSHIP
TAXATION 40 (1985).
3" See supra text accompanying notes 215-27.
"' See supra text accompanying note 351.
390 See FINAL REPORT, supra note 327, at 52.
"91 See supra notes 118-68 and accompanying text.
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the continuity of interest doctrine, to limit nonrecognition to those in-
stances in which the shareholder receives stock or securities in a corpo-
ration that is not publicly traded in an established securities market. 92
In defense of the Final Report, however, it can be argued that it
deals with the "May Kass effect." This alludes to Kass v. Commis-
sioner,39 3 in which a minority shareholder, May B. Kass, received stock
in a statutory merger and still was taxed because the other shareholders
received so much cash that the continuity of interest was destroyed.3
Thus, May Kass was taxed although she received only stock and had
no control over the transaction. Under the new proposals, May Kass
would not be taxed.
However, the improvement here is not as significant as might first
appear. Even under the new proposals, a minority shareholder is still a
minority shareholder and not in control of whether her corporation is
acquired. It is true that under the new proposals if a corporation is
acquired and the minority shareholder receives stock, she will not be
taxed, regardless of the consideration received by the other sharehold-
ers. However, a minority shareholder would be much less likely to re-
ceive stock under the new proposals. Stock would not be required to
confer nontaxability at the corporate level; thus there is less incentive to
issue stock in corporate acquisitions. Instead, more cash or bonds will
probably be distributed to the shareholders, resulting in the future May
Kasses being more likely to receive cash or bonds on which they will be
taxed, with the entire matter still outside of their control.39 5
6. Unforeseen Practitioner Ingenuity
This is not the first time that comprehensive proposals have been
promulgated to simplify and clarify all the problems of the law of taxa-
tion of corporate reorganizations. The review of the history of legisla-
tion in this area set forth earlier in this Article 9 ' does not, however,
292 To prevent the usual evasive techniques the rule should provide that nonrecog-
nition will be accorded only if the firm whose stock or securities are received is not an
affiliate of a firm whose stock is publicly traded on an established securities market.
83 60 T.C. 218 (1973), affd mem., 491 F.2d 749 (3d Cir. 1974); see also supra
note 165 (discussing Kass in greater detail).
394 60 T.C. at 227.
"' Under the new proposals, as under current law, if a shareholder gives up stock
and receives only bonds back, she will be taxed in full on the receipt of the bonds. See
FINAL REPORT, supra note 327, at 52.
In any event, what was so bad about the May Kass effect? Ms. Kass presumably
received capital gain on the exchange of her shares for new shares. If she does not like
being subject to the vagaries'of stock market transactions beyond her control, she should
not invest as a minority stockholder.
3'6 See supra text accompanying notes 81-117.
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inspire confidence that these proposals will be successful. The previous
legislative attempts have not accomplished these laudable goals and
sometimes have even worsened the situation. The development of the
law in this area is the result of continuing thrusts, counter-thrusts, and
parries by practitioners, the IRS, Congress, and the courts. This con-
tinual conflict is not surprising, given the great tax stakes involved.
Moreover, this process will probably not stop with the enactment of
these proposals. This is in no way meant to denigrate the Senate Fi-
nance Committee staff and others in the profession who have worked to
develop these proposals and their predecessors. It is, rather, more of a
testimony to the brilliance of the tax bar. I do not doubt that should
these proposals be enacted, the academic criticisms offered here will
pale in comparison with the creative avoidance maneuvers generated by
some of the leading lights in the profession: some of whom had a hand
in developing the proposals. 97
7. Transition
Notwithstanding the brilliance of the new tax planning that these
proposals will undoubtedly elicit from some leading practitioners, there
may be substantial problems for many tax practitioners in the transi-
tion to a major new set of corporate taxation rules. This issue should be
viewed in the context of the rapid pace of change in the taxation field
generally. The period from 1981 to 1984 has seen the enactment of
three major pieces of tax legislation. 98 This onslaught of change is per-
haps as debilitating to the system as complexity. In this setting, the case
for enacting the Senate Finance Committee staff's proposals would in-
deed have to be overpowering.
CONCLUSION
The present system for taxing corporate reorganizations has
evolved into an ungainly, complex body of law. In the early days of the
development of this law, there were two theories of how these transac-
tions should be taxed. One held that there should be just general, sim-
ple rules that the courts would interpret. The disadvantage of this the-
ory was the lack of predictability of results. The other theory held that
there should be a detailed statute covering all contingencies. The disad-
39 For a preview of some of the possible maneuvers on the new rules, see Gins-
burg, supra note 326, and Thompson, supra note 326.
"' Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494; Tax Equity
and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324; Economic
Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172.
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vantage of this view was that the statute would have to be extremely
complex. Remarkably, the system has evolved to have the disadvantages
of both theories. The web fair Penelope has spun does indeed ravel and
unravel.3 99
This is not to suggest, however, that the present system should be
abandoned. The present system is a fact of life and has been in place
for decades.
It is in this light that the proposals of the Senate Finance Commit-
tee staff should be viewed. These proposals, doing away with much of
the continuity of interest doctrine and creating an explicitly optional
system, have much to commend them and appear at first blush to be
simpler than the present system. This Article's criticisms of the propos-
als, however, demonstrate that this simplicity is illusory and that these
proposals are actually much more complex than they appear.400 This
$99 HOMER, THE ODYSSEY 24 (W. Rouse ed. 1937) ("There she was all day long,
working away at the great web; but at night she used to unravel it by torchlight.").
400 A major discussion of alternative proposals to reform the tax law is beyond the
scope of this Article. However, since this Article has criticized the proposals set forth in
the Final Report, it seems inappropriate to conclude without offering some alternative
speculations.
A major theme of those who criticize the American federal tax sys-
tem-particularly, the system of corporate taxation-is the great complexity of the pre-
sent law. It is said that complexity is so great a threat to the integrity of the tax system
that simplification should be the overriding concern in effecting change. See, e.g., PRE-
LIMINARY REPORT, supra note 182, at 1; Eustice, Tax Complexity and the Tax Practi-
tioner, 8 TAX ADVISER 27 (1977); Jacobs, supra note 325, at 415-17; Tax Policy
Report, supra note 325, at 328-31.
There are two interrelated proposals for simplifying the corporate tax system and
the tax system in general that seem to have merit: (1) to repeal the corporate tax; and
(2) to repeal the favorable treatment of capital gains. Taken as a package, these propos-
als effect a dramatic simplification without generating any obvious ill effects on the
equity of the system or on revenues.
Moreover, these proposals, taken as a package, may be relatively salable to the
public. The repeal of the corporate tax may be seen by the public as a giveaway to the
wealthier interests. The accuracy of that view is far from clear, inasmuch as the inci-
dence of the corporate tax has not been established. See Klein, The Incidence of the
Corporation Income Tax: A Lawyer's View of a Problem in Economics, 1965 WIS. L.
REV. 576; see also J. PECHMAN & B. OKNER, WHO BEARS THE TAX BURDEN?
(1974); Gordon, The Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax in U.S. Manufactur-
ing, 1925-1962, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 731 (1967). Making the package more palatable
to the public is the view that the repeal of the favorable treatment of capital gains is
something of a take-back from the wealthier interests. Similarly, those who are con-
cerned that repealing the favorable treatment of capital gains would depress needed
business investment could be met with the answer that the corporate tax was repealed.
The Senate Finance Committee staff stated that it simply "assumed that a corpo-
rate income tax would continue to be imposed," observing that "the Federal Govern-
ment began collecting a corporate income tax even before the 16th Amendment author-
ized an individual income tax. Nor is there any indication that the repeal of the
corporate income tax is imminent." PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 182, at 4.
The suggestions to repeal both the corporate tax and the favorable treatment of
capital gains are consistent with some of the ideas embodied in the recent Treasury
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complexity represents a serious problem for a set of proposals whose
major rationale was simplification.
Moreover, it appears that the reasons for attempting to overhaul
the system are open to question. The Preliminary Report states, for
example, that substantial abuses are occurring in the current system.4 °1
The Report refers to a number of problems created by the continuity of
interest doctrine, relating to McDonald's Restaurants v. Commis-
sioner,0 2 the treatment of arbitrageurs, and the use of holding compa-
nies to avoid the continuity of interest requirement in certain acquisi-
tions.40 3 The McDonald's case and the treatment of arbitrageurs have
been discussed above.40' The difficulties relating to the use of holding
companies were occasioned by the Service's own misstep in a private
letter ruling,405 which it cured in later rulings.406 It cannot seriously be
argued that these relatively recent technical problems justify overhaul-
ing the entire system of taxing corporate acquisitions. Given the availa-
bility of the heavy artillery of Gregory v. Helvering,4 °7 cited in both
holding company rulings noted above,408 it seems unlikely that any par-
ticularly egregious maneuver would last long.
Another reason given by the committee staff for overhauling the
entire system is that the tax consequences of acquisitive corporate reor-
ganizations that are economically similar can vary sharply, depending
on the form used and the type of consideration employed.4 9 The new
proposals, however, would also allow the tax consequences of acquisi-
tive transactions that are economically similar to vary sharply, at the
option of the parties. The difference between the current and proposed
regimes is that under the latter the option is de jure while under the
Department report to the President (so-called "Treasury I"), which proposes, among
other things, the abolition of the favorable treatment of capital gains and the allowance
of a partial deduction for dividends. See 1 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, U.S. DEPT. OF
THE TREASURY, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICrrY, AND ECONOMIC
GROWTH, at xii-xiv (1984); 2 id. at 133-37, 178-88.
401 See PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 182, at 1.
402 688 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1982). For a discussion of the McDonald's case, see
supra text accompanying notes 169-77.
403 See PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 182, at 29-32.
404 See supra text accompanying notes 169-205.
405 IRS Private Letter Ruling No. 7839060 (June 28, 1978) (available July 1,
1985, on WESTLAW, FTX-WD database).
406 See Rev. Rul. 80-285, 1980-2 C.B. 119; Rev. Rul. 80-284, 1980-2 C.B. 117.
Both rulings cite Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935). Presumably, the Service
will not become technically flawless in the administration of the tax law after the new
proposals are adopted.
4- 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
408 See Rev. Rul. 80-285, 1980-2 C.B. 119, 119; Rev. Rul. 80-284, 1980-2 C.B.
117, 118.
409 See PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 182, at 28.
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former the option is de facto. Indeed, as earlier discussion has demon-
strated, the proposed rules would still operate as a largely de facto
regime.
These criticisms point out the hazards of overhauling this area of
the law, where the transactions are so complicated and require advance
planning. The present system is at least a known quantity. If the his-
torical discussion above proves nothing else, it shows that judicially and
legislatively mandated changes in this area can give rise to complex
ramifications that are difficult to anticipate. These considerations might
be borne in mind by those who wish to embark upon yet another major
change of this area of law. "Those who cannot remember the past are
condemned to repeat it."1
410
410 1 G. SANTAYANA, THE LIFE OF REASON 25 (1905).
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